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ARTICLES

The Proposed Bankruptcy
Improvements Act: The Creditors
Strike Back*
By Robert E. Ginsberg**
Last session, bills under the innocuous title of the "Bankruptcy Improvements Act" (BIA)1 were introduced into both
* An addendum to this article will appear in the Spring issue of 3 N. ILL. U.
L. REV. (1983). See infra note 1.
** Professor, DePaul University College of Law. A.B. Brown University; J.D.
American University, Washington College of Law; LL.M. Harvard University.
The author would like to thank Karen H. Kennedy, a third year student at
DePaul University College of Law, for her assistance in preparing this article.
1. S. 2000, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S15,712 (Dec. 16, 1981)
amended, 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 4786, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). Although these
two bills were very similar, they were not identical, and the significant differences
between the two bills will be poined out. This article will tend to focus on the
Senate proposal, as that had gotten as far as a Committee Report at the time of
this writing, S. Rep. No. 446, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). Two versions of S. 2000
were introduced, and all citations within this article will be to the amended version of S. 2000. Subsequent to Senator Dole's introduction of the original S. 2000
on December 16, 1981, the bill was reintroduced as amended on May 27, 1982.
In addition to the above-mentioned House and Senate bills, Representative
Butler introduced H.R. 7294 on Oct. 1, 1982, and it subsequently went to the
Committee on the Judiciary. This bill would have, among many other things,
amended the Bankruptcy Reform Act and implemented parts of the BIA. H.R.
7294, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). Also, Senator Dole circulated a proposed bill
during the 1982 lame-duck session of Congress which would also have amended
certain provisions of the BRA. This bill was never formally introduced. The Dole
and Butler bills were written in an attempt to solve the problem created by the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Northern Pipeline Const. v. Marathon
Pipeline Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982), finding the jurisdictional grant given to the
bankruptcy courts by 28 U.S.C. § 1471 to be unconstitutional. The BIA represented only a small portion of the Dole and Butler proposals. Those bills were
also concerned with restructuring bankruptcy and other federal courts.
While this article was in publication, S. 2000 was reintroduced as part of the
Omnibus Bankruptcy Improvements Act of 1983, S. 445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983). This bill, which subsequently passed the Senate as amended (129 CONG.
REC. S5,383-88 (daily ed. April 27, 1983)), will be explained in an addendum to
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houses of Congress. These bills should not be confused with the
technical amendments bills" which have been introduced in Congress in order to correct drafting errors thought to exist in the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (BRA).' While the proposed BIA
may be brief, it is not innocuous. If passed, it would work fundamental changes in the entire concept of consumer bankruptcy."
This article examines the proposed BIA in some depth and comments on the propriety of the changes it would work in the area of
consumer bankruptcy.
MANDATORY CHAPTER

13

Under the existing Bankruptcy Code, a consumer debtor has a
choice between a chapter 7 or chapter 13 proceeding. The choice,
as a practical matter lies entirely with the debtor.' Chapter 7 is the
traditional liquidation proceeding and is begun by a voluntary or
involuntary petition.7 An interim trustee is immediately appointed
in every case s and takes possession and control of the debtor's nonthis article in the next issue of this Law Review. See generally S. Rep. No. 65,
98th Cong., 1st Seas. (1983).
2. See, e.g., S. 863, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 3705, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981).
3. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 through 1501 (subch. IXIII)(Supp. IV 1980).
4. While the major impact of the BIA would be on consumer cases, certain
proposed changes would have significant impact in commercial cases as well. See,
e.g., the proposed change in the preference provision, 11 U.S.C. § 547, discussed
infra in text accompanying notes 182 to 200.
5. Technically, a consumer debtor is eligible for chapter 11 as well. See 11
U.S.C. § 109(d). However, although individual chapter 11 cases do exist, such generally involve debtors engaged in business and are often related to chapter 11
cases, for business entities owned or operated by such individual debtors.
6. Under the BRA, there are certain requirements that a debtor must meet to
be eligible for relief under each of the chapters. For chapter 7 requirements, see
11 U.S.C. § 109(a) and (b). Chapter 11 requirements are contained in 11 U.S.C. §
109(d). For chapter 13 requirements, see 11 U.S.C. § 109(e). However, there is no
statutory language in § 109 requiring an individual debtor to file for relief under
any particular chapter.
7. See 11 U.S.C. § 301 (dealing with voluntary cases) and § 303 (covering
involuntary cases). See also 11 U.S.C. § 103(a), which covers the applicability of §
301 and § 303 to chapter 7 petitions. A husband and wife may file a joint chapter
7 petition according to 11 U.S.C. § 302.
8. See 11 U.S.C. § 701. The legislative history to this section states that
"[t]his section requires the court to appoint an interim trustee. The appointment
must be made from the panel of private trustees established and maintained by
the Director of the Administrative Office under proposed 28 U.S.C. § 604(e)." S.
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exempt assets pending further proceedings.9 The debtor must ap-

pear at a meeting of creditors held outside the presence of the
bankruptcy judge1" and must submit to an examination by the
trustee and creditors." In districts in which the United States
Trustee Pilot Program is in effect,"' the creditors' meeting is con-

Rep No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 92, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5787, 5878 (hereinafter cited as CONG. NEWS). See also H.R. Rep. No. 595,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 378, reprinted in CONG. NEWS 5963, 6334 (provisions similar

to S. Rep. 989). A slightly different procedure is followed in those districts where
the United States Trustee experiment is being tried. 11 U.S.C. § 15701 and 28
U.S.C. § 586. See also infra note 12.
9. According to 11 U.S.C. § 701(b), the service of an interim trustee terminates when a trustee, elected or designated under § 702 to serve as trustee in the
case, qualifies under 11 U.S.C. § 322. Until a trustee is so selected or designated,
the interim trustee is a trustee in a case under this title. Id. § 701(c). The trustee's duties are outlined in 11 U.S.C. § 704.
10. Id. § 341(c).
11. Id. § 343.
12. While bankruptcy reform was being considered during the 1970's, the
House proposed creating a national system of United States Trustees to be appointed by the Attorney General of the United States. The United States Trustees were to be based locally and, generally being autonomous, were to be loosely
supervised and assisted by the Department of Justice. See H.R. 8200, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. § 586(c) (1978). The United States Trustees were not intended to replace
private trustees in bankruptcy cases. Rather, they were to perform the supervisory and appointing powers handled by the bankruptcy judges under the BRA
and were to monitor trustee performance in more detail than under current practice. The primary function of the United States Trustee was to establish, maintain, and supervise panels of private trustees to serve in liquidation cases under
chapter 7 and to serve as trustee or to appoint standing trustees in chapter 13
cases. This proposal was finally adopted only as an experimental five-year pilot
program for 18 specified districts. See 11 U.S.C. § 1501; 28 U.S.C. §§ 581-589. Ten
United States Trustees are appointed for those districts by the Attorney General.
Some United States Trustees serve in more than one district. 28 U.S.C. § 581.
The pilot districts are the following: District of Maine, District of New Hampshire, District of Massachusetts, District of Rhode Island, Southern District of
New York, District of Delaware, District of New Jersey, Eastern District of Virginia, District of District of Columbia, Northern District of Alabama, Northern
District of Texas, Northern District of Illinois, District of Minnesota, District of
North Dakota, District of South Dakota, Central District of California, District of
Colorado and District of Kansas. 11 U.S.C. § 1501; 28 U.S.C. § 581. The United
States Trustee program experiment will expire on April 1, 1984, unless continued
by Congress. Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 408(c). The Butler bill would continue the
United States Trustee program and make it national in scope. However, supervision of the program would be shifted from the executive to the judiciary branch of
government. Each local bankruptcy court would decide whether the program is to
be implemented in its district by a vote of the local bankruptcy judges. See H.R.
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ducted by the interim trustee selected by the United States Trustee."8 In nonpilot districts, the creditors' meeting is conducted by
the clerk of the court.'4 Thereafter the trustee liquidates the
debtor's nonexempt property. Assuming the debtor has been honest with his/her creditors and the trustee, the debtor receives a discharge'" of all his/her dischargeable debtss regardless of how
much, if anything, the debtor's creditors have received in the chapter 7 liquidation proceeding. Of course, the vast majority of consumer chapter 7 cases are no asset cases, and unsecured creditors
in consumer chapter 7 cases can generally expect no payment
whatsoever in satisfaction of their claims against the debtor. 7
Chapter 13 is fundamentally different. It is the consumer reorganization proceeding, limited to individual debtors with regular
income who owe less than $100,000 on an unsecured basis and less
than $350,000 to secured creditors. 8 Chapter 13 is begun only by
voluntary petition;" a debtor cannot be forced directly or indirectly into a chapter 13 proceeding.2 0 Although in chapter 13 there
7294 § 199.

13.

SUGGESTED INTERIM BANKRUPTCY RULES,

Rule X-1003(b)(1) (11 U.S.C.A.

Supp. Pamph. 1983)(hereinafter INTERIM RULES). The Interim Rules were proposed by the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States for adoption as local bankruptcy rules, cf. 28 U.S.C. §
156. The legislative history to 11 U.S.C. § 341 states that generally the interim
trustee or the U.S. Trustee will preside over § 341 meetings. See H.R. Rep. 595,
supra note 8, at 331, CONG. NEWS at 6287; cf, S. Rep. 989, supra note 8, at 42,
CONG. NEWS

at 5828.

14. INTERIM RULES, supra note 13, Rule 2003(b)(1). In certain circumstances,
creditors may vote to have someone else conduct the meeting. Id.
15. 11 U.S.C. § 727.
16. Id. § 727(b). See id. § 523(a)(1-9),(b) for a listing of nondischargeable
debts.
17. The Brookings Institution study of bankruptcy, D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH,
BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM

§ 8, at 127 (1971), found that no distri-

bution was made to unsecured creditors in 84% of personal bankruptcy cases.
This was under the old Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, codified as
amended 11 U.S.C. (1976), which had a less generous exemption provision than
the present BRA. Compare former § 6, 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1976) (repealed 1979 by
the BRA) with 11 U.S.C. § 522 (Supp. V 1981).
18. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e). Only non-contingent liquidated debts count in computing these amounts.
19. See id. § 301 which deals with voluntary petitions. See also id. § 303
which limits involuntary petitions to chapters 7 and 11. A husband and wife may
file a joint chapter 13 petition. Id. § 302. However, in so doing they do not double
the $350,000/$100,000 limits. Id. § 109(e).
20. See supra note 19. See also 11 U.S.C. § 303. The legislative history to
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is a trustee,2 1 his/her role is essentially that of a disbursing agent.2"
The debtor remains in possession and control of all of his/her
property, exempt and nonexempt alike;" s/he must propose a plan
for dealing with the claims of his/her creditors24 and must submit a
portion of future income to the court for payment to creditors
under the plan. 2 ' The plan, unless accepted by each secured creditor affected by it, must either cure defaults in secured creditor
claims, or offer a secured creditor (other than one secured exclusively by the debtor's principal residence) payments with a present
value equal to the value of the secured creditor's collateral.2 Unsecured creditors do not vote on the debtor's proposed plan. Inthat section states that:
[Tlo do so would
Involuntary chapter 13 cases are not permitted ....
constitute bad policy, because chapter 13 only works when there is a willing debtor that wants to repay his creditors. Short of involuntary servitude, it is difficult to keep a debtor working for his creditors when he
does not want to pay them back.
H.R. Rep. 595, supra note 8, at 322, CONG. NEws at 6278. S. Rep. 989, supra note
8, at 32, CONG. NEws at 5818. See also 11 U.S.C. §§ 706(c), 1112(d) requiring the
debtor's consent to any conversion of either a chapter 7 or chapter 11 proceeding
to chapter 13.
21. 11 U.S.C. § 1302(a).
22. See id. § 1322(a)(1) which states that the plan shall provide for submission of future earnings of the debtor to the trustee as is necessary for execution of
the plan. The trustee then distributes payments to the creditors under the plan.
Id. § 1326(b). In a chapter 13 proceeding, while the trustee is not responsible for
the debtor's assets, s/he does serve as a financial advisor to the court and the
debtor. See id. § 1302(b).

23. Id. § 1306(b).
24. 11 U.S.C. § 1321 requires a debtor in a chapter 13 proceeding to file a

repayment plan. Only a debtor can propose a plan in a chapter 13 proceeding.
Rikes, Div. of Fed. Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Henderson, 17 Bankr. 271 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1982).
25. According to 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a), the debtor's plan shall provide for the
submission of such portion of future earnings or other future income of the debtor
to the supervision and control of the trustee as is necessary for the execution of
the plan. The plan may also be funded in part from the debtor's assets. Id. §
1322(b)(8).
26. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(b)(2),(5), 1325(a)(5)(B). Furthermore, according to
Rep. Edwards:
Unless the secured creditor accepts the plan, the plan must provide that
the secured creditor retain the lien securing the creditor's allowed secured claim in addition to receiving value, as of the effective date of the
plan of property to be distributed under the plan on account of the claim
not less than the allowed amount of the claim.
124 Cong. Rec. 32,410 (1978) (comments of Rep. Edwards).
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stead, the plan is to be approved by the court if it offers payment
in full over the life of the plan to priority unsecured creditors27 and
offers to general unsecured creditors payments with a present
value at least equal to what they would receive in a chapter 7 liquidation."8 If the debtor completes the payments called for by a confirmed chapter 13 plan, s/he receives a discharge on any unpaid
balances of his/her unsecured debts.29 The chapter 13 discharge is
broader than the chapter 7 discharge, as it not only discharges
those debts which would be discharged in a chapter 7 liquidation
proceeding, but also most debts which would not be dischargeable
in chapter 7 proceedings.80
Thus, the present philosophy of consumer bankruptcy is clear.
Bankruptcy involves a balancing of two competing philosophies:
giving fair and equal treatment to creditors and affording a debtor
a chance for a fresh start financially."1 The consumer debtor is of27. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2) states that the plan shall provide for the full payment of all unsecured claims entitled to priority. See id. § 507 for a list of unsecured priority claims.
28. Id. § 1325(a)(4). Of course, to be confirmed, the plan must comply with
other requirements of the code as well. See id. § 1325(a).
29. Id. § 1328(a).
30. Id. § 1328. Cf. id. § 727(b). Under 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a), a discharge
granted after a completed chapter 13 plan covers all debts provided for under the
plan except:
1. a debt, the final payment of which is not due until after the completion of the plan, where debtor has cured arrearages under the plan and
has agreed to make current payments. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5).
2. debt based on allowed claim filed under § 1305(a)(2) if prior approval
by the trustee of the debtor's incurring of such a debt was practicable
and was not obtained. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(d).
3. debts for alimony, maintenance and child support. See 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(5).
In theory, a chapter 13 plan discharges all other claims including those listed in
11 U.S.C. § 523(a). As a practical matter, however, federal, state and local tax
claims will usually be priority claims and must be paid in full over the life of the
plan. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 507(a),(b) with id. § 1322(a)(2). Beyond that, intentional tort claims, student loans, fines, etc. can be discharged for whatever percentage of payment was called for by the debtor's chapter 13 plan. Needless to
say, this result has been the subject of both judicial and legislative comment. See,
e.g., In re Rimgale, 669 F.2d 426 (7th Cir. 1982) and infra note 37 and accompanying text. Even if the debtor fails to complete payments under. the plan, under
certain circumstances the debtor may nevertheless be discharged. 11 U.S.C. §
1328(b). However, this extraordinary or hardship discharge does not apply to
those debts made nondischargeable by 11 U.S.C. § 523. Id. § 523(a).
31. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934); Segal v. Rochelle, 382
U.S. 375 (1966).
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fered a choice of vehicles for obtaining a fresh start so long as s/he
treats his/her creditors fairly. The consumer debtor can choose to
obtain relief in the traditional liquidation proceeding. For most
consumer debtors, the relief offered by chapter 7 is adequate. For
such debtors, the fresh start begins on the day the chapter 7 petition is filed. The nonexempt assets which the debtor has on that
date are turned over to a trustee to liquidate for the benefit of the
debtor's creditors. In exchange for cooperating in making his/her
nonexempt property available to creditors, the debtor is given a
discharge of all dischargeable debts owed on the date of the petition. In general, almost all property which the debtor acquires after the chapter 7 petition, including the debtor's post-petition income, is the debtor's to keep."2 Similarly, any obligations incurred
after the chapter 7 petition is filed are not discharged.
However, the Bankruptcy Code offers the consumer debtor an
alternative route to a fresh start. A chapter 7 petition may be
unattractive to a debtor for various reasons: (1) the debtor may
wish to pay his/her creditors in part or in full, (2) the debtor may
have nonexempt assets s/he wishes to keep, or (3) the debtor may
have problems with nondischargeable debts or with the discharge
itself. For this type of debtor, a chapter 13 proceeding, where the
fresh start is delayed, presents a potential solution to financial
woes. The debtor's post-petition property and income become part
of the bankruptcy estates8 available to creditors in the form of payments under the debtor's chapter 13 payment plan. 4 This in essence is the price which the debtor pays for the additional benefits
of chapter 13. The debtor's fresh start is delayed for the life of the
plan, and s/he does not receive a discharge until those payments
32. See 11 U.S.C. § 541. In general, property acquired by the estate or the
debtor after the commencement of the case is not subject to any lien resulting
from any security agreement entered into by the debtor before the commencement of the case. Id. § 552. However, property acquired by the debtor by inheritance, as beneficiary of a life insurance policy, or under a property settlement of
divorce decree within 180 days after a chapter 7 petition does become property of
the estate. Id. § 541(a)(5).
33. 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(1) includes property in the chapter 13 estate that the
debtor acquires after the commencement of the case but before the case is closed,
dismissed or converted to chapter 7 or 11. Section 1306(a)(2) includes as property
of the chapter 13 estate earnings from services performed by the debtor after the
commencement of the case but before the case is closed, dismissed or converted to
chapter 7 or 11.
34. See supra note 25. 11 U.S.C. § 1326(b) instructs the trustee to make payments to creditors under the plan.
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have been completed. 8 The debtor's property remains subject to

the control of the bankruptcy court and thus available to creditors

for payment on a continuing basis. The debtor may thus choose
between an immediate fresh start in the form of a chapter 7 liquidation or a delayed, but somewhat improved, fresh start in a chapter 13 rehabilitation proceeding. In theory, creditors should not
care which of these alternatives the debtor chooses so long as they
are treated fairly. The Bankruptcy Code seeks to assure this by
guaranteeing to creditors that they will receive payments with a
present value at least equal to the liquidation value of the debtor's
nonexempt assets regardless of which proceeding a consumer
debtor opts for."'
The crux of the problem is, of course, that consumer debtors
generally have little or no nonexempt assets, and thus the dividend
unsecured creditors can expect in a chapter 7 proceeding is usually
nothing. By the same token, the theoretical floor figure for payments to general unsecured creditors in many, if not most, chapter
13 proceedings is zero.87 The BIA seeks to cure this problem by
denying the choice between a chapter 7 or chapter 13 proceeding

to a debtor who under a subjective analysis could be expected to

pay off a significant amount of his/her debts over a five-year period. This is accomplished by an amendment to 11 U.S.C. § 109
35. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) states that after completion of all payments under
the plan the court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all debts provided for by
the plan except: (1) those debts for secured or unsecured claims, final payment of
which is due after the completion of the plan and which the debtor has agreed to
cure and keep current, id. § 1322(b)(5); and (2) those debts which are for alimony,
maintenance or child support payments, id. § 523(a)(5); and (3) certain post-petition claims, id. §§ 1328(d), 1305. However, according to 11 U.S.C § 1328(b), under
certain circumstances the court can grant the debtor a discharge where the debtor
has not completed the payments called for by the plan.
36. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). It provides that the court shall confirm a
chapter 13 plan if, inter alia, the value of property to be distributed under the
plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim is not less than the amount that
would be paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor were liquidated under
chapter 7.
37. Five out of the six courts of appeals which have considered the question
have held that the good faith requirement of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) does not require a particular level of minimum repayment as a prerequisite to confirmation
of a chapter 13 plan. See In re Kitchens, 702 F.2d 885 (11th Cir. 1983); Deans v.
O'Donnell, 692 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1982); Barnes v. Whelan, 689 F.2d 193 (D.C.
Cir. 1982); In re Goeb, 675 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Rimgale, 669 F.2d 426
(7th Cir. 1982). Contra In re Terry, 630 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1980). But see In re
Estus, 695 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1982).
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which would exclude from chapter 7 any individual who could pay
"a reasonable portion of [his/her] debts out of anticipated future
income.""5 The term "reasonable portion" is defined to be "a substantial percentage" of secured and unsecured debts other than the
mortgage on the debtor's home.89 The BIA contemplates that creditors would have until thirty days after the creditors' meeting held
under 11 U.S.C. § 341 to move to dismiss the chapter 7 proceeding
on the ground that the debtor could pay a substantial percentage
of his/her nonmortgage debt.'0 Creditors will be able to obtain the
information necessary to seek dismissal by examining the debtor at
38. See S. 2000 § 3(3).
[Section 3(a)] establishes a threshold eligibility test for individuals seeking to obtain liquidation relief under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Under present law, to be a bankruptcy debtor, a person need not have
liabilities exceeding assets; nor does a person have to be unable to repay
debts as they come due. This situation creates the potential for solvent
individuals to take unfair advantage of the special provisions of the Code
that limit actions by creditors or permit alterations in lease and loan
agreements that would not be permitted outside the bankruptcy court.
The new subparagraph (b)(1) in section 109, when read in conjunction
with the new subparagraph (c) of such section, would prohibit an individual from obtaining relief under chapter 7 where that individual can
pay "a reasonable portion of his debts out of anticipated future income."
S. Rep. 446, supra note 1, at 34.
H.R. 4786 § 2 (supra note 1) uses exactly the same language as S. 2000. The
Butler bill amends 11 U.S.C. § 101 by adding definitions of anticipated disposable
income and of reasonable portion of debts. H.R. 7294, supra note 1, §
301(a)(1),(2). Reasonable portion of debts is there defined as "70 percent in
amount of the debtor's debts listed on the schedule of liabilities filed under §
521(1) . . ., excluding a debt secured by a first security interest in the debtor's
principal residence." Id. § 301(a)(2).
39. [T]he term "reasonable portion of debts" is defined as a substantial
percentage of the total, outstanding debt (excluding debts secured by a
first mortgage or deed of trust on the debtor's principal residence) reflected on the schedule of liabilities filed by the debtor pursuant to section 521(a)(2) of the Code.
S. Rep. 446, supra note 1, at 34-35. See supra note 38.
40. The BIA would amend 11 U.S.C. § 305 (abstention) in the following ways:
(a) H.R. 4786 § 3 allows the court to dismiss a chapter 7 case on the motion
of any party in interest made not later than 30 days after the meeting of creditors
and after notice and a hearing, if the debtor is ineligible for relief because s/he
can pay a reasonable portion of his/her debts out of anticipated future income.
(b) S.2000 § 4(b) is very similar to H.R. 4786 but requires that the motion to
dismiss a chapter 7 case by a party in interest be filed prior to the conclusion of
the meeting of creditors.
(c) The Butler bill and Dole proposal do not amend § 305 in any way.
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the creditors' meeting and by requiring the debtor to file a statement of both present income and expenses and a one-year projection of income and expenses.41
The BIA takes the approach that if the debtor can pay, s/he
should. The articulated pressure behind this fundamental philosophy is that creditors do not lend on the strength of a consumer
debtor's assets,42 but rather on the basis of a debtor's income. The
logic is that a proceeding like a chapter 7, which deprives creditors
of access to the very asset on which they rely (the debtor's future
income), is unfair to creditors. Thus, any debtor who has the asset,
reasonably anticipated disposable future income, on which creditors presumably rely in extending credit, should not be permitted
to deny that asset to his/her creditors by utilizing the traditional
bankruptcy liquidation proceeding.
The BIA is not well thought out from both mechanical and
philosophical points of view. From a mechanical point of view, the
fundamental fallacy of the BIA lies in its imprecision. What is a
"substantial percentage"48 of the debtor's nonmortgage debt? fifty
percent? twenty-five percent? ten percent? It could be argued that
what is substantial may depend on the amount that the debtor
owes. For a debtor whose total debt load other than the first mortgage on his home amounts to $100,000, ten percent would seem to
be substantial. For a debtor who owes only $5,000 of such debt, ten
percent would be insignificant. Yet the statutory reference to "a
substantial percentage4 4 seems to indicate that a constant figure
41. S. 2000 § 7(a)(2); H.R. 4786 § 7(3).
In deciding whether the debtor can pay a reasonable portion of his debts
out of future income, the court will have access to a number of sources of
information. The debtor will submit his schedules of assets and liabili-

ties, as well as a statement of expected income and expenses for the 12
month period following the filing of the petition, pursuant to the provisions of section 521 ....
In addition, parties will present evidence at
the hearing on any section 305 motion to dismiss. The totality of this

evidence should provide the court with a comprehensive picture of the
debtor's financial picture, and enable the court to make a reasoned deci-

sion whether the debtor has substantial prospective debt paying ability.

S. Rep. 446, supra note 1, at 36.

42. "[C]onsumer credit is, more often than not, extended on the basis of the
individual's anticipated future income and the likelihood that it will continue.
Creditors thus assume the risk that the consumer's future income will not be adequate to repay the credit extended." S. Rep. 446, supra note 1, at 35.
43. See supra note 39.

44. See S. 2000 § 3(3) and supra note 39. Of course, the Dole bill (50%) and
the Butler bill (70%) would add definition to the term. These fixed percentage
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is to be applied to all debtors.
Also, the concept of disposable income is vague. It is any actual and anticipated income not needed for the support of the
debtor and the debtor's dependents."' This vague definition may,
in fact, give creditors a windfall. If the creditor did rely on the
debtor's future income in extending credit, the creditor knew or
should have known that the amount of the debtor's income which6
the creditor could reach involuntarily is typically limited by state4
figures would penalize the small debtor while allowing the debtor hundreds of
thousands of dollars in debt to utilize chapter 7 and deprive creditors of all future
income, even if such reasonable anticipated future income was substantial. By
way of example, a debtor who owed $10,000 and had reasonably anticipated disposable future income of $7,500 could not use chapter 7. On the other hand, a
debtor who owed $500,000 and had reasonably anticipated disposable future income of $125,000 could use chapter 7 enabling the debtor to keep the $125,000.
The unfairness of such a system is obvious. Yet the Senate Report makes it clear
that even if this debtor could pay 25% (i.e., $125,000) s/he would be eligible for
chapter 7.
The BIA does not clearly define "reasonable portion of debts" and "substantial percentage of outstanding debt." According to the Senate Report, these terms
were deliberately left vague. "The determination of what a substantial percentage
of the debtor's nonmortgage debt liability is in a given case will, of course, vary
depending on the court's evaluation of the totality of the debtor's financial circumstances." S. Rep. 446, supra note 1, at 35. This result seems to conflict with
the express statutory language.
The Senate Report offers the following guidelines as to when a chapter 7 proceeding should be dismissed:
In determining what constitutes a "substantial percentage" of nonmortgage debts, the Congress intends that the major consideration shall be
the assessment of what percentage of debts could be paid over a 3- to 5year period if the projected discretionary income available to the debtor
were to be applied to the satisfaction of those debts in a deferred
monthly payment plan. Where an individual debtor would clearly retire
as much as 75 percent of such debts during that period of time, that
debtor would presumably be found to have the ability to pay a reasonable portion of his debts, and would thus not qualify for chapter 7 relief.
Conversely, if the debtor could pay no more than 25 percent of his debts
during the same period, the debtor clearly does not have substantial debt
paying ability and would be eligible for chapter 7 relief.
S. Rep. 446, supra note 1, at 36-37.
45. In determining whether the debtor can pay a "substantial percentage" in
the individual case "[t]he court is expected to consider the amount and regularity
of the debtor's after-tax income; the expenditures he must make for the support
of himself and his dependents; the likelihood of increased future income and expenses . . .; the need for a cushion for unexpected expenses; and the obligations
the debtor faces for debt repayment . . . ." S. Rep. 446, supra note 1, at 35-36.

46. In Illinois, for example, the amount of the debtor's income that creditors
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of federal47 law. There is no similar limit under the BIA.
In addition, the vague language of the BIA is almost guaranteed to promote litigation, as it encourages creditor objections to
the use of chapter 7 proceedings by all except the most destitute of
debtors in terms of disposable income. In this regard, it is important to ,realize that any dispute as to the availability of chapter 7
relief will have to be litigated. 8 In such litigation, the creditor in
most cases will presumably have little difficulty in hiring and compensating competent counsel to represent it; however, the same
cannot be said for a debtor attempting to file bankruptcy. Most
consumer debtors would have difficulty paying counsel for representation in such threshhold litigation since such debtors have little or no disposable assets. Indeed, that notion is the fundamental
premise of the BIA. The fact that the debtor would likely be at a
can reach involuntarily is governed by §§ 12-801 through 12-818 of the Illinois

Code of Civil Procedure (now codified under ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 (1982)).
Under § 12-803, in most cases, 85% of the debtor's gross wages are exempt from
the creditors' collection attempts.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a) (1976) states that "the maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of an individual for any work week which is subject to
garnishment may not exceed (1) 25% of his disposable earnings for that week, or
(2) the amount by which his disposable earnings for that week exceed 30 times
the federal minimum hourly wage prescribed by § 206(a)(1) of title 29 in effect at
the time earnings are payable, whichever is less."
The restrictions of the above paragraph do not apply in the case of: (A) judicial or administrative orders for the support of any person; (B) cases under chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code; (C) debts for any state or federal taxes. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1673(b). See id. § 1673(b)(2) for the limitations on the percentage of disposable
earnings which can be garnished to enforce orders for support.
48. Creditors cannot force a debtor to convert involuntarily to chapter 13. 11
U.S.C. § 706(c). All they can do is seek to dismiss the chapter 7 petition. Id. § 305.
However, such litigation should be common under the BIA since a debtor with no
or nominal future income and no nonexempt assets worth saving has nothing
creditors can reach at state law and probably will not bother to file a chapter 7
petition. Such a debtor is in common parlance "judgment proof" and has no need
for bankruptcy relief. Only individual debtors with something creditors can reach
under state law need to file a chapter 7 petition; yet most consumer chapter 7
cases are no asset cases. Thus one might hypothesize, as the Purdue Study
(CREDIT RESEARCH CENTER, KRANNERT GRADUATE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT, PURDUE UNIVERSITY, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY STUDY (1982) [hereinafter cited as PUR-

DUE STUDY]) concluded, that a significant number of chapter 7 debtors have no

assets but income they wish to protect from creditor pressure. In a significant
number of chapter 7 cases, the debtors would be of the sort to attract creditor
efforts to reach future income under the BIA by challenging the chapter 7 petition. The Purdue Study concluded that 40-50% of all individual chapter 7 debtors would be affected by the BIA. Id. at 99.
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significant disadvantage in such litigation would further encourage
nonmeritorious objections to the use of chapter 7 in marginal
cases.4 9 While it is true that the Senate version of the BIA does
provide for attorney's fees to a debtor for a successful defense to a
creditor attempt to have a chapter 7 petition dismissed on the
grounds of a debtor's ability to pay,6 0 such fees can be awarded
only if the creditor is unable to show that the objection was filed in
good faith. In light of such a vague standard as "a substantial percentage"5 of nonmortgage debt, it is hard to imagine a creditor
being unable to assert effectively that the motion to dismiss was
filed in good faith, at least until case law develops the meaning of
"substantial percentage" of debt.
Furthermore, a dismissal, if it does occur, would be under 11
U.S.C. § 305." Although the Senate version of the BIA specifies
that such a dismissal is "without prejudice to the debtor, "5 meaning, presumably, that the debtor could refile a chapter 7 at any
time in the future, such a dismissal would also be nonappealable."
The original purpose of section 305 was to prevent a few recalcitrant creditors from upsetting an out-of-court workout by means of
a technically well grounded involuntary petition." It seems to work
49. The notion of nonmeritorious creditor litigation designed simply to gain
an undeserved advantage over a poorly represented debtor is not unknown in
bankruptcy history. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 523(d); H.R. Rep. 595, supra note 8, at 365,
CONG. NEWS at 6321; S. Rep. 989, supra note 8, at 80, CONG. NEWS at 5866.
50. S.2000 § 4(2).
In practice, then, creditors would only file a motion to dismiss in the case
of a debtor whose debt-paying ability is sufficient to justify the costs of
the proceedings. A further protection against creditor over-reaching with
respect to the threshold is the grant of authority contained in the revised
sections 105(a) and 305 (subparagraph b thereof) which will allow the
court to award attorney's fees and costs to the debtor if it is determined
that a challenge was not filed or presented in good faith.
S. Rep. 446, supra note 1, at 35. H.R. 4786 contained no provision to this effect.
51. S.2000 § 3(3). See supra note 39.

52. S. 2000 § 4(2).

53. Id.
54. According to 11 U.S.C. § 305(c), an order dismissing a bankruptcy case or
suspending all proceedings in a bankruptcy case, or a decision not to dismiss or
suspend a bankruptcy case, is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise. The legislative history to this section states that with regard to this matter the bankruptcy
court, based on its experience and discretion, is vested with the power of decision.
H. R. Rep. 595, supra note 8, at 325, CONG. NEWS at 6281-82; S.Rep. 989, supra
note 8, at 35-36, CONG. NEWS at 5821-22. See In re Covey, 650 F.2d 877 (7th Cir.

1981).

55. The legislative history to 11 U.S.C. § 305 states:
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a fundamental -

and unfair -

change to extend the provision to

consumer debtors by forcing them out of chapter 7 with no right of
review. Certainly such a change should not be worked without a
great deal of thought and investigation.
Another gap in the area of mechanics appears in connection
with involuntary petitions. While involuntary petitions are rare in
individual cases, the possibility clearly exists. 6 Involuntary petitions are available under chapters 7 or 11 but not chapter 13.
Suppose three creditors with more than $5,000 in non-contingent
unsecured claims file an involuntary chapter 7 petition against an
individual who is in general default on his/her obligations but who
could pay a substantial percentage of his/her debts from reasonably anticipated future income. Suppose further another creditor
objects to the use of chapter 7, and the debtor refuses to transfer
to chapter 13. Under the BIA, it would appear that the chapter 7
petition must be dismissed." Yet that would leave the three petitioning creditors worse off than they would have been without the
BIA: they would be denied bankruptcy relief in courts. On the
other hand, permitting involuntary chapter 13 petitions would
seem to raise serious questions with regard to involuntary servitude and the thirteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.5 9 The BIA apparently does not represent a perfect solution to
A principle of the common law requires a court with jurisdiction over a
particular matter to take jurisdiction. This section recognizes that there
are cases in which it would be appropriate for the court to decline jurisdiction .... Thus, the court is permitted, if the interest of creditors and

the debtor would be better served by dismissal of the case or suspension
of all proceedings in the case, to so order. The court may dismiss ... for
example, if an arrangement is being worked out by creditors and the
debtor out of court, there is no prejudice to the rights of creditors in that
arrangement, and an involuntary case has been commenced by a few recalcitrant creditors to provide a basis for future threats to extract full
payment. The less expensive out-of-court workout may better serve the
interest in the case.
H.R. Rep. 595, supra note 8, at 325, CONG. NEws at 6281; S. Rep. 989, supra note
8, at 35-36, CONG. NEWS at 5821-22.
56. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(a).
57. See supra note 19.
58. S. 2000 § 4(2) states that the court may dismiss a case under chapter 7

upon the motion of any party in interest. H.R. 4786 § 3 contains the same
language.

59. The thirteenth amendment to the United States Constitution states that
"neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for a crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
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some of the problems which have been shown to exist under the
BRA.
In addition, the consequences of a dismissal need further
thought. The Senate version gives the debtor fifteen days after an
order of dismissal to decide what to do. 60 During that time, the
debtor and the debtor's assets continue to be protected by the automatic stay." The Senate version points rather clearly towards a
conversion to chapter 13.2 However, not all individual debtors are
eligible for chapter 13. Under the BIA a debtor who had reasonably anticipated future income which would be sufficient to pay a
substantial percentage of nonmortgage debt but which is not "regular" may not utilize chapter 13.-' Similarly, if a debtor owed more
than $100,000 on an unsecured basis or more than $350,000 on a
secured basis, the debtor would be ineligible for chapter 13 relief
regardless of whether the debtor could pay a substantial percentage of that debt or not. While such a debtor would be technically
eligible for chapter 11,64 that chapter is primarily designed for busStates, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
60. S. 2000 § 4(2). H.R. 4786 § 3 merely states that "the court may dismiss a
case under chapter 7... upon the motion of any party in interest made not later
than thirty days after the meeting of creditors, and after notice and a hearing if
the debtor is ineligible for relief under the provisions of section 109(f)" (as
amended).
61. See S.2000 § 4(2).
62. Id. "Since most debtors who are ultimately denied chapter 7 relief will, in
all likelihood, file under chapter 13, there will be ample opportunity for the court
to alleviate any hardship that may unexpectedly result from the initial denial of
chapter 7 relief through a motion and order of conversion." S. Rep. 446, supra
note 1, at 37.
63. S. 2000 § 3(3) defines anticipated future income as income that the
debtor has a reasonable expectation of receiving either from sources which "(i) are
providing actual income at the time of the filing of the petition, or (ii) will provide
income commencing within twelve months following the filing of the petition, and
which is not needed by the debtor for the support of himself and his dependents."
This definition appears to require a certain degree of regularity with regard to the
debtor's anticipated future income. However, 11 U.S.C. § 101(24) defines an individual with regular income to be one whose income is "stable and regular" enough
to make payments under a chapter 13 plan. Stability is not a requirement of the
BIA definition. Thus a debtor could satisfy the BIA definition without meeting
the BRA requirements for chapter 13 eligibility. In re McGowan, 24 Bankr. 73
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982).
64. 11 U.S.C. § 109(d) states that "[o]nly a person that may be a debtor
under chapter 7 of this title, except a stockholder or a commodity broker, and a
railroad may be a debtor under chapter 11 of this title." There are no income nor
debt limit requirements for chapter 11 eligibility.
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iness debtors and is a far more complex and expensive proceeding
than either chapter 7 or chapter 13.05 It would hardly seem appropriate to leave chapter 11 as the only bankruptcy option available
to a consumer debtor. In addition, it is worth noting that a consumer debtor could frustrate the ability of creditors to reach the
debtor's future income by filing a chapter 11, proposing a liquidation plan, making the necessary disclosure, and securing creditor
approval. s Confirmation of the plan by the court should follow, as
it would clearly give the creditors at least liquidation value and is
obviously feasible. 7 The plan would be binding on both consenting
and nonconsenting creditors, and confirmation would likely discharge the debtor.58 Since there is no requirement in chapter 11
that the debtor make future income available to creditors," this
approach would frustrate the BIA and deny creditors the very asset they so eagerly seek. Again, the BIA would appear to require
65. For example, chapter 11 requires submission of plans to unsecured creditors for approval with appropriate degrees of court approved disclosure. In chapter 13, unsecured creditors do not vote on the debtor's plan and there is no
equivalent of a chapter 11 disclosure statement in chapter 13. Compare 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1125, 1129 with id. § 1325. Other features of chapter 11 such as mandatory
appointment of unsecured creditors' committees, id. § 1102, are equally inappropriate in the context of consumer insolvency.
66. See id. §§ 1123(b)(4), 1125, 1126.
67. See id. § 1129(a) for a description of the requirements that must be satisfied before the court will confirm a chapter 11 plan.
68. The provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor, any creditor of the
debtor, whether or not the claim or interest of such creditor is impaired by the
plan and whether or not such creditor accepted the plan. Id. § 1141(a).
Section 1141(d) provides that the confirmation of a plan discharges an individual from dischargeable debts that arose before the date of the confirmation.
The exception found in 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(3) denying discharges in chapter 11
liquidation cases would not generally apply to individual debtors who usually
would be eligible for a discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727.
69. 11 U.S.C. § 1123 delineates the mandatory contents of a chapter 11 plan.
Subsection (a) does not require that the debtor make future income available to
his or her creditors. In contrast, 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(1) requires that a chapter 13
plan "provide for the submission of all or such portion of future earnings or other
future income of the debtor to the supervision and control of the trustee as is
necessary for the execution of the plan .

. . ."

This seems to require the debtor to

make some future income available to creditors in chapter 13 proceedings. But see
supra note 37 and cases cited therein.
Although the author is opposed to the BIA, if it is enacted, 11 U.S.C. § 109(e)
should be amended to allow any individual debtor who has had a chapter 7 petition dismissed on income grounds to file a chapter 13 petition within some fixed
time regardless of the nature of the debtor's income or the amount of the debtor's
liabilities.
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more thought.
There also seem to be several philosophical weaknesses with
the BIA. The proposal is based on the premise that the Bankruptcy Reform Act has failed. That conclusion is reached on the
basis of less than three years' experience.70 Furthermore, little
study has been done of the BRA.7 1 Nevertheless, the proponents of
the BIA argue that there has been a major increase in the number
of bankruptcies since the BRA became effective, and that this is

attributable in large measure to the fact that the BRA made too
many value judgments in favor of consumer debtors and against
the interests of consumer creditors, costing consumer creditors billions of dollars in uncollectable consumer loans. The proponents
then argue that the pendulum should be swung back the other way
by changing the law to favor creditors and by making bankruptcy
less attractive to consumer debtors. This can be done by forcing
debtors into proceedings where they must pay a significant portion
of creditors' claims. A further premise, of course, is that large numbers of debtors who could pay their debts are escaping the obligation to do so by filing chapter 7 petitions. Finally, the proponents
further argue that the change from an alternative asset based/income based system of consumer bankruptcy to one based purely on
income, except in the case of debtors with little or no disposable
income, is logical because the consumer credit industry is based on

70. On October 1, 1979, the Bankruptcy Reform Act went into effect. Pub. L.
No. 95-598, title IV, § 402, 92 Stat. 2682. The Senate version of the BIA was first
introduced on December 16, 1981. See supra note 1. The BIA is a result of the
general oversight hearings that the Subcommittee on Courts held during 1981.
71. The largest study to date is the two volume Purdue Study which examined some 1,200 individual chapter 7 proceedings from some 20 judicial districts in 10 states. The Purdue Study endorses the BIA concept; however, it
should be contrasted with the extensive efforts which led to the BRA. Bankruptcy
law reform was studied by the neutral federal Commission on the Bankruptcy
Laws of the United States for several years. Congress then spent another half a
decade studying and fashioning the BRA based on the lengthy report and the
proposals of the Commission. Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy
Law, 28 DE PAUL L. REV. 941 (1979).
The most comprehensive and competent evidence of the fact that a percentage of individuals filing in chapter 7 had a substantial repayment capability was
provided by the testimony of Dr. Robert Johnson, director of the Credit Research
Center, located at the Krannert School of Management at Purdue University.
Professor Johnson, in conjunction with the counseling firm of Arthur D. Little,
Inc., conducted a study of persons who had filed bankruptcy petitions. The study
was based on a sample of recent debtors in 10 states across the country. S. Rep.
446, supra note 1, at 8.
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debtors' incomes and not assets. 2
The proponents' logic is hard to attack simply because the evidence is lacking on both sides. The BRA was the result of more
than eight years of exhaustive study of the bankruptcy process.7a
Nevertheless, it is clear that the BRA is far from perfect, particularly in its consumer provisions. 7' However, it seems inappropriate,
based on so little experience and evidence, to in effect abandon its
consumer reform provisions. Instead, logic suggests reconvening
the Bankruptcy Commission to study further the problems which
have arisen under the BRA in consumer cases. There is no firm
evidence as to what percentage of the increase in bankruptcy
filings is attributable to the enactment of BRA as opposed to other
factors such as the state of the economy. Also, there is little reliable data as to the amount of losses creditors have suffered under
the BRA. The notion that large numbers of debtors who could pay
a significant percentage of their debts are escaping those obligations through chapter 7 proceedings is based on a single study
financed by the consumer credit industry of some 1,200 debtors in
twenty districts.7 ' It seems clear that a major change in consumer
bankruptcy ought to be based on a much broader, more neutral
study.
Also, while it is beyond argument that consumer lenders do
give great weight to a debtor's income in the credit process, it does
72. See, e.g., statement of Jonathan N. Landers before the Senate Subcommittee on Courts of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Oversight Hearings

(4/3/81) Serial No. J-97-11, at 40.
73. See Klee, supra note 71, at 941.

74. Compare, e.g., In re Kitchens, 702 F.2d 885 (11th Cir. 1983); Deans v.

O'Donnell, 692 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1982); Barnes v. Whelan, 689 F.2d 193 (D.C.
Cir. 1982); In re Goeb, 675 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Rimgale, 669 F.2d 426

(7th Cir. 1982); In re Terry, 630 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1980). See also In re Estus,

695 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1982).
75. The Purdue Study was financed by the Coalition for Bankruptcy Reform,
"a group made up of a broad cross section of the consumer credit industry and
associated organizations." PURDUE STUDY, supra note 48, at vi. Anticipating
charges of bias which "are, of course, based on the false premise that what is good

for the [consumer credit] industry is bad for consumers and vice versa," the au-

thors of the Purdue Study devote several pages to protesting that the study is in

fact neutral. Id. See also W. SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act III, sc. 2, line 242. The
Bankruptcy Commission, on the other hand, which was a driving force behind the

BRA, consisted of three Presidential appointees, one Senate member from each
party and two appointees of the Chief Justice of the United States. Pub. L. No.
91-354, § 2(a), 84 Stat. 468 (1970). Obviously, the Bankruptcy Commission did
not have to protest that it was neutral.
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not follow that such lenders do not regard assets as pertinent in
making such credit decisions. A fundamental distinction must be
drawn here between secured and unsecured creditors. It would
seem clear that secured lenders, in both the business and consumer
situation, rely on both a debtor's assets and future income in extending credit. Outside of the bankruptcy context, the importance
of the self-help remedy7s or even replevin 7 7 to secured creditors in
their collection efforts clearly transcends the significance of garnishment, the remedy which such creditors would use to get at a
debtor's future income involuntarily.78 Unsecured creditors, of
course, cannot utilize self-help remedies in their collection of assets. Outside of bankruptcy, when the debtor defaults, the unsecured creditor is given the choice of going after the debtor's assets by means of attachment or execution7 9 or going after the
debtor's future income through garnishment.80 The idea of alternative asset based or income based proceedings in bankruptcy does
not, therefore, seem to be absolutely contrary to creditor expectations in the event of default.
In the business debtor bankruptcy, the debtor chooses between chapter 7 or chapter 11. Presumably, most business debtors
who have future income and whose situations are not hopeless will
76. The remedy of self-help is only available to secured creditors. Under § 9503 of the Uniform Commercial Code, a secured creditor can seize collateral without notice so long as it can be done without a breach of the peace. This procedure
does not violate the due process protections contained in the United States Constitution because no state action is involved. See, e.g., Benschoter v. First Nat'l
Bank of Lawrence, 210 Kan. 144, 542 P.2d 1042 (1975).
77. Replevin is a state law remedy which enables secured lenders to have the
sheriff seize collateral from a defaulting debtor on short notice or perhaps no notice at all. See, e.g., The Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 110,
§§ 19-101 to 19-124 (Supp. 1982) (the Illinois replevin statute). See also Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 4i6 U.S. 600 (1974).
78. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 12-801 to 12-818 (the Illinois wage

deduction or wage garnishment statute). This is post-judgment garnishment, i.e.,
wage garnishment by a judgment creditor. Most states also provide for pre-judgment garnishment of wages. See, e.g., id. § 4-126. The validity of pre-judgment
garnishment statutes is doubtful. See Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S.

337 (1969).
79. Attachment is a pre-judgment remedy used by unsecured creditors to
seize and hold certain assets of the debtor pending outcome of the litigation. See,
e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 4-101 to 4-145. Execution is a post-judgment remedy used by a judgment creditor to reach assets of the debtor in satisfaction of a
judgment. See, e.g., id. §§ 12-101 to 12-818.
80. See supra note 78.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

opt for chapter 11. Although, in theory, this makes the debtor's
future income available to unsecured creditors, that is not, in fact,
the case. If a class of unsecured creditors accepts the debtor's
plan,"1 the dissidents within the class are guaranteed only liquidation value. There is no requirement that a chapter 11 debtor make
future income available to unsecured creditors.82 If one assumes, as
the proponents of the BIA claim, that the decision of a creditor to
make a loan on an unsecured basis is premised primarily on the
debtor's future income (whether a business or consumer debtor is
involved), it is hard to see why a fundamentally different system of
bankruptcy should exist depending upon what kind of debtor is
involved. At present, the similarities between the systems of consumer and business bankruptcies outweigh the differences. 8 No
reason has been given why one system but not the other should be
changed radically.
In fact, outside of bankruptcy, only one group of creditors has
a clear right to a consumer debtor's future income-creditors who
have obtained a consensual security interest in a debtor's future
income through a wage assignment.8 4 Both state law85 and bank-

81. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c). A class of creditors accepts the plan if creditors,
holding at least 2/3 in amount and more than 1/2 in number of the allowed claims

in the class vote for it.
82. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a) with id. § 1322(a).
83. Thus, the theory seems to be that a business debtor has a right to an

initial choice between a chapter 7 liquidation proceeding and a chapter 11 reorganization proceeding while an individual consumer debtor can similarly choose
between a chapter 7 liquidation and a chapter 13 rehabilitation proceeding. See
id. § 109.
84. A wage assignment is fundamentally different from a wage deduction order. The wage assignment is more similar to a voluntary security interest than to
a lien obtained by judicial proceeding. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 101(27) with id. §

1O1(37). Under a wage assignment, a debtor consents to the use of his/her wages

as a security for a debt. Upon default, without notice, the creditor can demand

part of the debtor's wages from the debtor's employer. Thus, the creditor, in effect, can obtain through a consensual wage assignment a security interest in the
debtor's future wages. The assignment is enforced by self-help rather than judicial proceedings. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 39.1 to 39.11.

85. Id. See infra note 84. The Illinois statutes are an example of the state's

hostility to wage assignments. Under Illinois law, the maximum amount that can

be assigned is 15% of the debtor's gross wages. No demand can be served on the
debtor's employer until the debtor has been in default for 40 days, and then only
if the debtor has 20 days' notice that the creditor would make this demand. This
20-day notice to the debtor gives him/her time to make a defense. If the debtor
claims and files a defense with the employer, the creditor has to bring an action
for the debt; at this point the wage assignment is cancelled and the credit be-
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ruptcy laws have long been hostile to wage assignments. Yet the
BIA would, for the first time, in effect, validate the wage assignment for an unsecured creditor who had the foresight to obtain
such. Of even greater significance, however, is the fact that the
BIA would force the debtor involuntarily to give the benefits of a
five-year wage assignment to those unsecured creditors who lacked
the foresight or were unable to obtain such assignment from the
debtor at the time of the extension of credit. It would seem that
such a radical change in the philosophy of bankruptcy, from a
debtor relief proceeding to a creditor collection proceeding, ought
to be based on inquiry and information, not on a seat-of-the-pants
notion that something is wrong and that the solution is to implement the ideas of creditor organizations.
GENERAL CHANGES IN CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY

Creditors' Meetings
Under the BRA a meeting of creditors must be conducted in
all cases, regardless of whether the bankruptcy is under chapter 7,
11 or 13,87 to enable the creditors and trustee to examine the
debtor to determine if s/he has dealt honestly with creditors and
the court.8 8 Although the creditors' meeting is an essential feature,
especially in chapter 7 proceedings where the inquiry into areas
such as nonexempt assets and acts bearing on discharge and dischargeability is often crucial, the creditors' meeting was regarded
at the time of the enactment of the BRA as an administrative
comes unsecured. The debtor has an additional 5-day grace period because the

45th day is the first time the employer can pay the debtor's wages over to the
creditor. In addition, the wage assignment enforcement process is only valid for

30 days and the whole process must be repeated every 30 days. See also U.C.C. §
9-104(d).
39.5.

86. See Local Loan v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934). Cf. ILL. REV.

STAT.

ch. 48, §

87. 11 U.S.C. § 341(a) states that "[w]ithin a reasonable time after the order

for relief in a case under this title, there shall be a meeting of creditors." (emphasis added).
88. The debtor is required to appear and submit to examination under oath
at the § 341(a) meeting of creditors. Id. § 343. Creditors, any indenture trustee, or
any trustee or examiner in the case may examine the debtor. The purpose of the
examination is to enable creditors and the trustee to determine if assets have

improperly been disposed of or concealed or if there are grounds for objection to
discharge. H.R. Rep. 595, supra note 8, at 332, CONG. NEWS at 6288; S. Rep. 989,
supra note 8, at 43, CoNG. NEWS at 5829.
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function. 9 In connection with this, one of the major accomplishments of the BRA was the elevation of the status of bankruptcy
judges,90 accomplished in part by removing bankruptcy judges
from nonjudicial proceedings and confining them exclusively to judicial functions. Thus the BRA specifically prohibits the bankruptcy judge from presiding over the creditors' meeting.9 1 The
meeting is conducted by the United States Trustee or his/her designee in "pilot" districts9 or by the clerk of the bankruptcy court
in non-pilot districts.9 8 The BIA would change this by having the
bankruptcy judge "convene" the creditors' meeting and "perform
such additional judicial duties as may be required ....

.

While

89. It was contemplated by Congress that the interim trustee or the United

States Trustee, and not the bankruptcy judge, would preside. 11 U.S.C. § 341(c).
This is in keeping with the thrust of the Bankruptcy Reform Act to remove the
bankruptcy judge from administrative matters and not to involve him in situations where he will hear evidence outside of the context of a dispute he must
decide. H.R. Rep. 595, supra note 8, at 331, CONG. NEWS at 6287. But see S. Rep.

989, supra note 8, at 42, CONG. NEWS at 5828. The meetings are in fact conducted
by the U.S. Trustee or interim trustee in U.S. Trustee "pilot" districts. INTERIM
RULES, supra note 13, Rule X-1003(b)(1). However, in nonpilot districts, the clerk
of the bankruptcy court conducts the meeting. Id., Rule 2003(b)(1).
90. "Removing the judge from the first creditors' meeting was a Code innovation. The reason for this change is easy to understand. One goal of the Code was
to raise the statuts of Bankruptcy judges." Ulrich, Comments on the Consumer
Finance Industry's Proposals to Improve the Position of Secured Creditors in
Consumer Bankruptcy Cases, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 381, 397 (1982) (quote
citing H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-18, 22 reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5976-80, 5983). See also Jackson, Bankruptcy Then and
Now, 45 AM. BANKR. L.J. 249, 270 (1971). Unfortunately, the BRA did not elevate
the bankruptcy judges far enough to constitutionally permit the broad grant of
jurisdiction which they were given by 28 U.S.C. § 1471. By failing to give bankruptcy judges lifetime tenure and by limiting their terms to fourteen years, id. §
153(a), Congress acted improperly. See Northern Pipeline Const. v. Marathon
Pipeline Co., 102 S.Ct. 2858 (1982).
91. 11 U.S.C. § 341(c).

92.

INTERIM RULES,

supra note 13, Rule X-1003(b)(1).

93. Id., Rule 2003(b)(1). In certain circumstances, the creditors may by vote
designate a different person to preside over the meeting. Id.
94. S.2000 § 5.
The amendment requires the bankruptcy judge to convene-but not
necessarily preside over . . . the section 341(c) meeting of creditors, and
directs the court to perform such judicial functions which may be required under this title or necessary to resolve disputes arising at such
meetings.
The new provisions recognize that the bankruptcy judge can perform
vital judicial functions at the meeting of creditors which should be ren-
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the bankruptcy judge is not required to be present during the entire meeting, s/he is expected to be readily available to settle disputes that might arise during the meeting.95 Again, this appears to
be an ill-conceived idea unless disinterested inquiry shows the
need to change the present system. The BIA would saddle the limited corps of bankruptcy judges"' with the need to convene more
than 400,000 creditors' meetings. 97 It would promote litigation in
an area where little litigation now exists. There appears to be no
reason at present why disputes arising at creditors' meetings can99
not be brought before the bankruptcy judge for resolution.
dered as early in the bankruptcy proceedings as possible. Disputes over
the scope of inquiry of the debtor, and alleged deficiencies in the debtor's
petition and schedules, must be resolved by a judge ....

It is intended

that disputed matters be resolved early in the administration of the estate and without necessity for separate contested or adversary proceedings. Such proceedings impose an additional cost upon both creditors
and debtors, without any corresponding benefit.
S. Rep. 446, supra note 1, at 38-39.
H.R. 4786 § 4(2) also provides for the court to be involved with the meeting
of creditors. The Butler bill provides that "[t]he court shall resolve any dispute
that arises during a meeting under this section promptly, in conjunction with the
meeting." H.R. 7294 § 302(a).
95. See infra note 94.
96. There are approximately 240 bankruptcy judges (including 227 full-time
judges and 13 part-time judges) presently serving in the United States. As of September 15, 1982, there were in excess of 500,000 bankruptcy proceedings pending
before these judges. H.R. Rep. No. 807, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1982).
97. There were 545,045 bankruptcy petitions filed during 1982. With regard
to voluntary petitions, 256,173 represented chapter 7 filings, 18,543 represented
chapter 11 filings, and 103,738 represented chapter 13 filings. Of 1,749 involuntary
petitions filed during 1982, 1,471 were chapter 7 filings and 278 were chapter 11
filings. There were also 9 chapter 9 railroad bankruptcy petitions filed. In addition, 164,833 joint petitions were filed in 1982, of which 113,345 represented chapter 7 filings, 3,236 represented chapter 11 filings, and 48,252 represented chapter
13 filings. Telephone interview with Ms. Mary Boone, Administrative Office of
U.S. Courts, Statistical Analysis and Reports Division, Washington, D.C. (May 19,
1983).
98. The presiding officer at the meeting, be it the U.S. Trustee or his/her
designee or the clerk of the bankruptcy court, merely chairs the meeting and performs administrative matters such as administering oaths. As the Interim Rules
recognize, disputes arising at the meeting can only be resolved by the judge in
separate or additional proceedings. INTERIM RULES, supra note 13, Rule X1003(b)(3), (d). The purpose of 11 U.S.C. § 341(c) is to prevent the bankruptcy
judge from hearing evidence outside the context of dispute resolution. See H.R.
Rep. 595, supra note 8, at 331, CONG. NEWS at 6287. But see S. Rep. 989, supra
note 8, at 42, CONG. NEWS at 5828.
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Furthermore, the BIA's central purpose of mandatory chapter
13 proceedings for individual debtors who can pay a significant
percentage of non-mortgage debt does not require the bankruptcy
judge's presence at the creditors' meeting. Creditors can ferret out
the information required to object to a debtor's improper use of
chapter 7 at a creditors' meeting conducted under the present system. The process of objecting to a debtor's alleged improper use of
chapter 7 should be a separate legal proceeding, conducted by the
bankruptcy judge, independent of the informal setting of the creditors' meeting. This is yet another matter requiring a good deal of
further inquiry and thought.
Changes in Exemptions
The BIA would make major substantive and procedural
changes as to what debtor property is exempt from creditors in a
bankruptcy proceeding. These changes are not very subtle; they
shift the balance of the law of exempt property in bankruptcy significantly in favor of creditors. This is, of course, in direct conflict
with the basic premise of the BIA that consumer creditors have
little or no concern with a debtor's assets, but are almost entirely
concerned with a debtor's future income.
The BRA significantly changed the law of exemptions in favor
of debtors. Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, a debtor was allowed to keep only that property which would have been exempted
to the debtor under state law."9 The BRA gives the debtor a choice
between that property which would be exempt under the debtor's
state law and that property which is exempt under a generous federal exemption provision. 10 0 The debtor gets to choose between
99. Section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 states that "this title shall not
affect the allowance to bankrupts of the exemptions which are prescribed by
the

laws of the United States or by the State laws in force at the time of the filing of
the petition in the State wherein they have had their domicile for the six months
immediately preceding the filing of the petition." 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1976)(repealed

1979). See infra note 105.

100. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b).

Notwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individual debtor may

exempt from property of the estate either(1) property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section, unless

the State law that is applicable to the debtor under paragraph (2)(A) of
this subsection specifically does not so authorize; or, in the alternative,
(2)(A) any pioperty that is exempt under Federal law, other than subsec-

tion (d) of this section, or State or local law that is applicable on the date
of the filing of the petition at the place in which the debtor's domicile
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federal and state exemptions unless the debtor's state legislature
has affirmatively chosen by statute to deny to its citizens the benefits of the federal exemptions and to limit its debtors to state exemptions. 10 1 At present, some thirty-two states have chosen to opt
out of the federal substantive exemption provisions,102 which reflects effective lobbying of creditor interests in state legislatures to
the detriment of consumers. One can assume that opting out of the
federal exemptions is detrimental to debtors because it is hard to
imagine a state legislature bothering to opt out if state exemption
1
law were more generous than the federal law. "" The BIA would
has been located for the 180 days immediately preceding the date of the
filing of the petition, or for a longer portion of such 180-day period than
in any other place ....
Id. The generous federal exemption is found in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d).
101. Section 522(b) was originally intended to allow an individual debtor to
choose between exemption systems by allowing the choice of the federal exemptions in § 522(d) or the exemptions to which he is entitled under the federal
nonbankruptcy law and the law of the-state of his domicile. H. Rep. 595, supra
note 8, at 360-61, CONG. NEWS at 6316-17. A late amendment to the BRA, however, permitted states to opt out of the federal exemptions. Where the state legislature of the debtor's home state so chooses, the debtor can be prevented by state
statute from choosing the federal exemptions. Although the states are permitted
to determine whether the bankruptcy exemptions will be available as an alternative to federal and state nonbankruptcy exemptions in bankruptcy cases, the state
must expressly prohibit the use of the bankruptcy exemption alternative in order
to prohibit such election by the debtor. 124 CONG. REc. 32,398 (1978).
102. The thirty-two states which have opted out of the federal bankruptcy
exemptions under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) are the following: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia and Wyoming. Brief
for Debtor-Appellant, In re Sullivan, 680 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S.Ct. 349 (1982).
103. At the time Illinois opted out, the Illinois law offered a debtor exemptions for a $10,000 homestead (but only if the debtor was the head of a household), necessary wearing apparel, school books, a family bible, family pictures and
$300 (or $1,000 if the debtor was the head of a household) in other personal property. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 52, §§ 1, 13 (1979)(repealed by P.A. 82-280, see ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110, §§ 12-910, 12-1001 (1981)). Thus, the single debtor got no homestead, $300 in personal property and little else. This stands in sharp contrast with
the rights such a debtor would have under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d), including, inter
alia, a $7,500 homestead, $1,200 equity in a car, all items of a household furniture
and similar personal goods worth $4,200 or less, $500 equity in jewelry, $750 equity in tools of trade and a grabstake of any property the debtor wished to save to
a total value for $400 plus the unused portion of the homestead exemption. Obvi-
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complete the opt out process by repealing the substantive federal
exemption law.104 This would revive the system under the old

Bankruptcy Act where exemptions were determined strictly by reference to local law. 10 5
The repeal of the federal substantive exemption provision
seems objectionable from several points of view. First, if, as

claimed, unsecured consumer lenders make credit decisions based
strictly on prospective income, increasing the amount of assets
available to them in chapter 7 proceedings by lowering the debtor's
exemptions gives such creditors a windfall where their judgment
about the debtor's income prospects has proved faulty. 106 Sec-

ously, it was not Illinois debtors who went to Springfield to urge the Illinois legislature to opt out. Even though the Illinois exemption law has subsequently been
amended to make it more beneficial to debtors, by making a $7,500 homestead
available to all debtors, by putting a $2,000 cap on the personal goods exemption
and by eliminating the grabstake exemption, it is still less generous than 11
U.S.C. § 522. See ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 110, §§ 12-901, 12-1001 (Supp. 1982). Examples can be seen in other states. See, e.g., In re Rhodes,. 14 Bankr. 629 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 1981). On the other hand, Texas and Wisconsin, both of which have
generous exemptions laws are conspicuously absent from the list of states opting
out of the federal exemption.
104. See H.R. 4786 § 8(b) which states that 11 U.S.C. § 522 is amended by
striking out subsection (d). The original S. 2000 § 7(b), which was introduced on
December 16, 1981 (see supra note 1), would also have amended 11 U.S.C. § 522
in the same manner. S. 2000 § 8(a)(3) as amended would not delete subsection (d)
but would place a $200 per item limit and $3,000 in aggregate value limit on
household goods of the debtor which could be exempted. The Butler bill, H.R.
7294 § 305(a), did not make any substantive changes to 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) but
both would, however, put a $3,000 ceiling on the personal goods exemptions in 11
U.S.C. § 522(d)(3).
105. No specific exemptions were provided by the former Bankruptcy Act.
See supra note 99. 11 U.S.C. § 24 (repealed 1979). The old Act allowed a debtor
to save only that property exempted by state exemption statutes and decisions,
and federal statutes (independent of the Bankruptcy Act) which grant certain allowances and exemptions. State exemptions were far more important as they covered a wider class of property. See generally 1A W. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 6.03, at 797 (14th ed. 1976).
106. If the assumption of footnote 103 is correct, i.e., state exemption laws
are less generous than 11 U.S.C. § 522(d), then repeal of this section and a return
to strictly state law will result in a benefit to creditors in most states. In those
states where state exemption laws are more generous than 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) and
where the state has not already opted out, one assumes that most debtors already
choose the state law exemption, and that repeal of § 522(d) would have little effect. This is true whether the debtor is in chapter 7 or indirectly is forced into
chapter 13 by having the chapter 7 dismissed on prospective income grounds
under the BIA. Obviously, in a chapter 7 proceeding, if fewer assets are exempt,
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ondly, and perhaps more importantly, bankruptcy is a federal specialty. The United States Constitution mandates a single uniform
national policy with respect to bankruptcy law.""7 While a national
exemption law for bankruptcy is probably not constitutionally required, 108 the policy of uniformity would be better served by a single national law in this area. 0 9 It is hard to understand why the
fate of debtors and creditors in bankruptcy proceedings should depend on accidents of geography. State exemption laws differ
greatly in what they allow a debtor to keep." 0 What a chapter 7
debtor gets to keep in Wisconsin may well go to the trustee in a
chapter 7 in Illinois."' In a mobile society, creditors have no legitimate expectation that a particular exemption law will necessarily
apply to any particular consumer credit transactions. In fact, results would be far more predictable for lenders if a single federal
exemption applied in all bankruptcies throughout the United
States. Therefore, logic dictates that what should be repealed is
not the federal substantive exemption provision, but the opt out
more assets can be sold by the trustee and the dividend to unsecured creditors

will be increased, thereby cutting their losses from the bankruptcy. In a chapter
13 proceeding, a reduction of exempt property benefits the unsecured creditors
because 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) fixes a minimum amount the debtor must offer
general unsecured creditors in order to have the plan confirmed. These payments
must have a value at least equal to what the general unsecured creditors would
have gotten had the debtor opted for a chapter 7 proceeding instead of a chapter
13. Thus, the less of the debtor's property which is exempt, the higher is the
minimum payment which general unsecured creditors must be paid in a chapter
13 proceeding.
107. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
108. See Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902); In re Sullivan,
680 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 349 (1982).
109. In fact, such a national bankruptcy exemption would not represent a
radical departure from United States history in this area. Several nineteenth century United States bankruptcy laws contain a national bankruptcy exemption
law. See Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, §§ 5, 18, 34 & 35, 2 Stat. 19. See also
The Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 3, 5 Stat. 440. See generally Comment,
Bankruptcy Exemptions: Whether Illinois's Use of the Federal "Opt Out" Provision is Constitutional,1981 S. ILL. U.L.J. 65, 78 & 79.
110. See PURDUE STUDY, supra note 48, at 18-21.
111. In Illinois, the homestead exemption is only $7,500. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110, § 12-901 (Supp. 1982). In Wisconsin, the Homestead exemption is $25,000.
WiS. STAT. § 815.20 (1977). Thus, a debtor with, say $20,000 equity in his/her
home would lose it to a trustee if the debtor were an Illinois resident, but would
keep it if s/he were a Wisconsin resident. Obviously, this result is not uniform. Cf.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. But see In re Sullivan 680 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 349 (1982).
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provision. If Congress believes the present federal exemptions have
proved to be too generous to debtors, then the appropriate change
is to modify those federal exemptions, not abolish them.
The BIA would also make a significant change in connection
with the procedure for securing the debtor's exemptions in bankruptcy. In contrast, the BRA provides that a debtor may clear nonpurchase money security interests from most types of exempt tangible personal property.1 1 This, of course, has the effect of giving
the debtor the property and leaving the non-purchase money
lender with an unsecured claim which will likely be discharged for
little or no payment. It is important to note that, although states
may opt out of the federal substantive bankruptcy exemptions,
they may not opt out of the procedural provisions of 11 U.S.C. §
522 of the BRA.1"' Thus, debtors have the ability to avoid nonpurchase money security interests in most exempt personalty in
both opt out and non-opt out states.
In a subtle way, the BIA amendments to § 522(f)(2) in fact
recognize the premise that unsecured consumer credit is generally
extended based on future income rather than assets. A creditor
who does not finance a consumer purchase, but who takes essential
consumer assets as security, does not take that security for the
traditional purpose of assuring a means of obtaining a liquidation
return on the loan in the event of default. Items such as used
household furniture are of little monetary value to such creditors,
who are not in the business of selling used furniture and are thus
not in a position to dispose of the collateral efficiently. In addition,
the value of the collateral is often a small fraction of the loan.
Such lenders do not want the collateral on default and take a nonpurchase money security interest in essential household goods only
in order to be in a position to threaten the debtor with repossession in the event of bankruptcy: They hope that the debtor, to save
the necessary household goods, will agree to pay the entire debt,
which is generally an amount far in excess of the value of the col112.
personal
interests
113.

11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2). This right is limited to certain described exempt
property and does not apply, inter alia, to nonpurchase money security
on motor vehicles or real property.
In re Maddox, 27 Bankr. 592 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Curry v. Associates Fi-

nancial Services, 11 Bankr. 716 (N.D. Ohio 1981). But see In re McManus, 681
F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1982) which allowed Louisiana to in effect deny the 11 U.S.C. §
522(f)(2) remedy to its citizens. The McManus case contains a strong dissent by
Judge Dyer.
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lateral to either the debtor or the creditor.11' Congress believed
that this process was inconsistent with both a debtor's fresh start
It
and with the traditional notions of what a secured creditor is. 115
therefore permitted the debtor to avoid such security interests.
The BIA would repeal this provision." 6 Why this is necessary
is far from clear. Obviously it does nothing to further the primary
purpose of the BIA or to directly make the debtor's future income
available to creditors. Instead it gives certain creditors access to
just what they say they do not want-the debtor's assets. This provision is simply a shift of economic bargaining power in the bankruptcy context from debtors to creditors. It has not been shown
that § 522(f)(2) has failed to achieve its stated purpose of preventing finance companies from holding small values of property essential to the debtor hostage to extract a reaffirmation of a large consumer debt. Rather, it has probably worked to achieve just that
end, and that is exactly why creditors want it repealed. The reinstatement of the validity of non-purchase money security interests
in exempt personalty coupled with the modification of judicial protection for the debtor in the reaffirmation process"' effectively
puts the finance companies back in the driver's seat in the reaffirmation process in chapter 7 proceedings.
Dischargeabilityof ParticularDebts
The BIA would make two significant changes in the general
law of dischargeability of particular debts. Both changes occur in
114. See generally H. Rep. 595, supra note 8, at 127, CONG. NEWS at 6088. It
is important to realize that under the Code, even if the lien were to survive, such
a creditor would be treated as a secured creditor only to the extent of the value of
the collateral. The excess of the claim over the value of the collateral, i.e., the
deficiency, would be unsecured and likely be discharged. See 11 U.S.C. § 506. The
creditor needs to use the collateral as leverage to get the debtor to reaffirm the
entire debt, not just the secured portion which, when household goods are collateral, will often be a very small portion of the entire claim. At present, judicial
control over reaffirmations should prevent such reaffirmations which would be antithetical to the debtor's best interests. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c), (d). However, the BIA
proposes changes in the reaffirmation process as well. See infra text accompanying notes 168-81.
115. See H. Rep. 595, supra note 8, at 127, CONG. NEWs at 6088.
116. See S. 2000 § 8(b). See also H.R. 4786 § 8(c). The Butler bill, H.R. 7294
§ 304, states that 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) "shall not apply with respect to liens perfected or enforceable before October 1, 1979." Cf. United States v. Security Indus.
Bank, 103 S.Ct. 407 (1982).
117. See infra text accompanying notes 168-81.
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the area of debts based on fraud, false pretenses, or a false
financial statement.116 Such debts, of course, in general would continue to be nondischargeable.119 However, the BIA would work a
major change in the process by which it is determined whether or
not a particular creditor's claim is excepted from the discharge. As
might be expected, these changes in procedure work against the
debtor and in favor of creditors asserting a claim of
nondischargeability.
The first change is an addition to present § 523 of the Bankruptcy Code. 1 0 The BIA would add a presumption that debts incurred by the debtor within forty days12 1 before a petition is filed
are nondischargeable on grounds of fraud, false pretenses, or a
false financial statement.12 ' The presumption would be rebuttable;
however, it would seriously alter the litigation strategy in virtually
every consumer bankruptcy. The purpose of the proposed change
is to discourage the debtor from "loading up," i.e., acquiring large
118. See H.R. 4786, supra note 1, § 9(a)(1) (the House version of the BIA).
The Butler bill (H.R. 7294, supra note 1) is similar to S. 2000. Section 9(b) of S.
2000 provides that any debt which was incurred on or within 40 days before the
date of the filing of a petition under this title is presumed to be nondischargeable
but this presumption shall be rebuttable by the debtor. The Butler bill, H.R. 7294
§ 306, uses the same statutory language but does not provide that this presumption is rebuttable by the debtor. Section 9(b) of S. 2000 also provides that "[i]f a
creditor requests a determination of dischargeability of a consumer debt ..
and
such debt is discharged, the court may grant judgment against such creditor in
favor of the debtor for the costs of, and a reasonable attorney's fee for, the proceeding to determine dischargeability if it finds that the proceeding was not
brought by the creditor in good faith." The Butler bill § 306 allows the court, in
this situation, to grant judgment against the creditor for costs, "if under the circumstances of the particular case the court determines that it would be equitable
to do so."
119. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2). Section 9(b) of 2000 does not directly affect §
523(a)(2). The same is true for H.R. 4786, the Butler bill and the Dole proposal.
120. See 11 U.S.C. § 523; S. 2000 § 9(b); H.R. 4786 § 9(c).
121. See S. 2000 § 9(b) (40-day time period); H.R. 4786 § 9(c) (90-day time
period). The time period in the Butler bill (Q306) is also 40 days. See supra note
118.
122. See S. 2000 § 9(b) (read together with 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)).
The new subsection (d)[of 11 U.S.C. § 523] creates a rebuttable presumption that any debt incurred by the debtor within 40 days before the
filing of the petition has been incurred under circumstances that would
,

make the debt nondischargeable ....

The burden is upon the debtor to

demonstrate that the debt was not incurred in contemplation of discharge in bankruptcy and thus a fraudulent debt.
S. Rep. 446, supra note 1, at 41.
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amounts of goods and/or services on credit, knowing that bankruptcy is imminent and that such debts will not be paid. 123 While
the goal is laudable, the proposed change is both unnecessary and
amounts to overkill. Under present law if a debtor incurs debts by
use of credit cards or bad checks with the intent at the time of the
extension of credit of discharging such debts in an about-to-befiled bankruptcy, such debts are not dischargeable. 24 Although the
creditor seeking to avoid discharge of its claim has the burden of
showing the debtor's intent in this regard, such has not proved to
be impossible in appropriate cases. 125 The change proposed by the
BIA shifts the burden of going forward on the issue of intent to the
debtor, presumably to prove that s/he did in fact intend to pay the
debt at the time it was incurred. More importantly, it virtually assures that every creditor with a claim of any moment arising
within the forty days preceding a petition will file an objection to
the dischargeability of its claim, 2 forcing the bankrupt debtor to
123. Excessive debts incurred within a short period prior to the filing of
the petition present a special problem . . . . A debtor planning to file a
petition . . . has a strong economic incentive to incur dischargeable
debts for either consumable goods or exempt property. In many instances, the debtor will go on a credit buying spree in contemplation of
bankruptcy at a time when the debtor is, in fact, insolvent. Not only does
this result in direct losses for the creditors that are the victims of the
spree, but it also creates a higher absolute level of debt so that all creditors receive less in liquidation.
S. Rep. 446, supra note 1, at 19.
124. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2).
125. See, e.g., In re Turner, 23 Bankr. 681 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982); In re
Schnore, 13 Bankr. 249 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1981); United Bank of Denver v. Kell,
6 Bankr. 695 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980).
126. The only expense which the creditor would incur for the filing of such a
routine objection would be attorney's fees for drawing the complaint and a $60
filing fee for filing an adversary proceeding. See RULES BANKR. PROC. Rule 701, 11
U.S.C.A. (West 1977)(hereinafter cited as BANKR. PROC.) and 28 U.S.C. § 1914
(Supp. IV 1980). Thus the economics would favor such an objection being filed. In
fact, in light of the presumption it might constitute malpractice to fail to file such
an objection. This is particularly true in light of proposed changes in 11 U.S.C. §
524(d). See infra text accompanying notes 168-81.
It should also be pointed out here that the presumption is raised for all
"debts" incurred during the forty days preceding a petition. "Debt" is liability on
a claim, 11 U.S.C. § 101(11), and claims include any obligation whether contingent, noncontingent, secured, unsecured, etc., id. § 101(4). This would seem to be
too broad a presumption. If the premise of "loading up" is valid, the problem can
be dealt with by creating a presumption of fraud with respect to fixed unsecured
obligations incurred within forty days preceding a petition.
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litigate what will likely be a significant number of adversary proceedings on the issue of the dischargeability of such claims; in such
proceedings the burden of proof will be on the debtor. In light of
the second proposed change to be discussed immediately below, it
is likely that the debtor would have to provide and compensate
his/her own counsel in such litigation. As a practical matter, a
bankrupt debtor will likely be unable to afford to litigate the objections. At best the debtor will be forced to settle such objections
regardless of the merits.127 At worst, the debtor will default and all
forty-day claims will become nondischargeable. Finally, of course,
the proposed change is likely to increase significantly the number
of complaints filed to determine dischargeability, thus greatly increasing the caseload of bankruptcy judges.
The second change proposed by the BIA in the general dischargeability area is a change in an existing provision of the BRA.
The BRA sought to end the practice, which had arisen under the
old Bankruptcy Act, of certain creditors, usually finance companies, routinely filing objections to dischargeability of their claims,
frequently alleging that the debtor had filed false financial statements. The objection would be filed whether grounds existed or
not in the hope that the debtor, being bankrupt, would not be able
to afford counsel to litigate the objection and would either settle
the objection by a partial reaffirmation, or would default."'8 To end
this abuse, Congress provided that if a creditor filed an objection
to the dischargeability of a claim based on the grounds of fraud,
false pretenses, or false financial statements and lost, the creditor
had to pay the debtor's attorney's fees for the successful defense,'"
except in unusual cases. The fact that the creditor filed the objec-

tion to dischargeability in good faith is irrelevant. 18o

The BIA would change this by providing that the debtor may
be awarded attorney's fees for a successful defense to an objection
to dischargeability on grounds of fraud, false pretenses, or a false
financial statement only if the court finds that the objection was
filed in bad faith. "' This will not discourage a creditor whose claim
127. Such settlement at present would be subject to judicial review and approval. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c), (d). But see infra text accompanying notes 168-81.
128. H. Rep. 595, supra note 8, at 365, CONG. NEWS at 6320-21.
129. 11 U.S.C. § 523(d). This provision applies only to objections filed under
§ 523(a)(2). It does not apply to any other objections to dischargeability.
130. See In re Schlickmann, 7 Bankr. 139 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980). But see In
re Archangeli, 6 Bankr. 50 (Bankr. D. Me. 1980).
131. See S. 2000 § 9(b). H.R. 4786 § 9(b)(2) contains the same language. The
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arose within forty days before the petition from filing an objection
to dischargeability. Assuming that the presumption of fraud for
forty-day claims discussed above is implemented, it could hardly
be argued that any creditor who forced the debtor to prove that
the debt was not incurred fraudulently was acting in bad faith. In
fact, a subjective issue such as bad faith is not easily proven. Only
in egregious cases will a debtor be able to show that a creditor who
filed an objection to dischargeability was proceeding in bad faith.
Thus awards of attorney's fees to debtors for successful defenses to
objections to dischargeability will become rare.1 82
The effect of the two changes in this area is to promote litigation against the debtor in the dischargeability question and to
make it difficult for the debtor to arrange for effective representation in such litigation. No reason has been shown for such a
change. There is no empirical evidence that significant numbers of
debtors are "loading up" in anticipation of bankruptcy, nor is
there evidence that the present provision with respect to attorney's
fees for the debtor for a successful defense to an objection to dischargeability is not working. Therefore, the change proposed by
the BIA is nothing more than a policy change intended to alter the
litigation posture in the dischargeability area in favor of creditors.
The appropriateness of such a policy change .should be clearly
demonstrated before Congress drastically alters the present
situation.
Butler bill (§ 306) allows the court to grant judgment "against the creditor and

for the debtor if the court determines that under the circumstances of the partic-

ular case it would be equitable to do so."
132. But see 11 U.S.C. § 303(i)(2) which allows punitive damages for an in-

voluntary petition filed in bad faith. A showing of bad faith is not required for an
award of attorney's fees to the debtor for successfully defending against an involuntary petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(i)(1). However, even proof of bad faith does
not guarantee the debtor a recovery of punitive damages. In re SBA Factors of
Miami, Inc., 13 Bankr. 99 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981).
Perhaps a better change would be to expand 11 U.S.C. § 523(d) to allow attorney's fees to a debtor for a successful defense not only to an objection under 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(2), but to other areas where creditor abuse has not been unknown,
such as objections filed under § 523(a)(4) or (6). See Countryman, The New Dischargeability Law, 45 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1971). If a bad faith standard is to be
used, then there is no reason to limit the award of attorney's fees to the debtor to
objections filed under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2). It would seem a debtor ought to be
able to get attorney's fees for defending against any bad faith objection to dischargeability filed under any ground.
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Secured Creditors
The BIA makes several significant changes in the area of secured creditors' rights, one of which has significant, negative impact on consumer debtors. The amount of a creditor's secured
claim is the value of its security. 18 Any excess of claim over the
value of security, i.e., any deficiency, is an unsecured claim, at least
in chapter 7 or 13 proceedings.1 8 ' Thus, the value of collateral, or
the method of valuing collateral, can be of great importance in
consumer cases.' 35 Under the BRA, courts have generally and logically valued consumer collateral in light of what a creditor could
get for it, such as resale or liquidation value.'" The BIA would
change this by providing that for purposes of chapter 7 redemptions or chapter 13 secured creditor cram-downs, the value of consumer collateral is to be based on "resale market value.'

37

Pre-

133. 11 U.s.c. § 506(a). Although this author, through force of habit, clings
to the older term "secured creditor," the correct usage under the BRA would refer
to such a creditor as a "holder of a secured claim."
134. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). On the applicability of § 506(a) to chapter 7 and
13 proceedings, see 11 U.S.C. § 103(a). Holders of secured claims in chapter 7 or
13 cases have no right to elect to be treated as fully secured creditors in certain
circumstances, as do secured creditors in chapter 11 cases. See id. § 1111(b).
135. For example, the value of the collateral determines the amount the
debtor must pay to redeem certain collateral in a chapter 7 proceeding. See 11
U.S.C. § 722. In a chapter 13 proceeding, the value of the collateral determines
the amounts of the payments the debtor must make to force a plan on a dissenting secured creditor. See id. § 1325(a)(5).
136. See, e.g., in re Adams, 2 Bankr. 313 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1980); In re
Stumbo, 7 Bankr. 939 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981). But see In re Clements, 11 Bankr.
38 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).
137. See S. 2000 § 6(3). H.R. 4786 § 6(3) is identical to the Senate provision;
the Butler bill would not make any changes to 11 U.S.C. § 506.
The committee, after review of the testimony detailing experience with
the valuation provisions of the 1978 Code, has concluded that the courts
have, in too many cases, undervalued collateral property to an extent
which denies adequate protection to secured creditors .... Many courts
have fixated upon wholesale resale as the appropriate standard, even for
property with a high resale value in the retail market .... [TIhe original
intent of the Congress in this regard has not uniformly been carried into
practice by the courts. ...
The committee has concluded that further elaboration of congressional intent is required in order to dispel confusion. Thus, the proposed
bill specifies the preference of the Code for use of a resale market standard, with the choice of wholesale or retail measurements of value to be
determined by reference to the condition of the property and the
debtor's proposed use or disposition thereof. In either case, the commit-
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sumably this means value would be based on what it would cost
the debtor to replace the collateral rather than what the creditor
could get for it. In a resale market there would be a markup by the
market maker, so that what a creditor could get for the collateral
would be less than the debtor would have to pay to replace it.
Why the debtor should pay this markup is less than clear. Security is of benefit to creditors, not debtors; should the debtor default, the secured creditor can obtain possession of the collateral
and sell it to satisfy the claim. The creditor has no legitimate expectation of receiving anything more than what it can sell the collateral for. If the creditor gets value from a third party purchaser
or the debtor, the creditor's expectations in the transaction have
been fulfilled. If the BIA were enacted, creditors secured by consumer collateral would get a windfall in the bankruptcy context
which they would not receive in a nonbankruptcy collection context. 13 8 While the logic behind the provision may be unclear, the
purpose is not: to reduce the possibility of use of chapter 7 redemption or chapter 13 cram-down as a means for the debtor to
obtain the collateral for less than full payment of the debt. Thus,
the debtor, to save the collateral, will have to reaffirm or promise
to pay a larger amount of the debt, and creditors will thereby be
given access to the debtor's future income. 3 9 This makes sense
tee bill encourages reference to trade publications as appropriate indicia
of the market value of the property in question.
S. Rep. 446, supra note 1, at 16.
138. Outside of bankruptcy, the most efficient collection method for secured
creditors is non-judicial seizure of collateral, i.e., self-help. This remedy is usually
available to creditors with consensual security interest in the debtor's personal
property provided that the collateral can be repossessed without a breach of the
peace. U.C.C. § 9-503 (1978). In that process, the secured creditor either keeps the
collateral in satisfaction of the debt or sells the collateral and sues the debtor for
any deficiency. U.C.C. §§ 9-504, 9-505. Unless the debtor chooses to redeem the
collateral by paying the full balance of the debt plus collection expenses, U.C.C. §
9-506, the most the creditor can get out of the collateral is whatever it can sell it
for. In judicial foreclosure proceedings, the secured creditor will get even less, due
to the the context and costs of the sale.
139. Of course, such reaffirmation would usually require judicial approval. 11
U.S.C. § 524(c), (d). But see infra text accompanying notes 168-81. It is interesting to note that if the collateral is abandoned, 11 U.S.C. § 554, or otherwise returned to the creditor, id. §§ 725, 1325(a)(5), the lower value to the creditor on
disposition value would apparently be used. This would, of course, increase the
amount of the creditor's unsecured claim. Id. § 506. Thus, the BIA would once
again succeed in giving the debtor the worst of both worlds while giving the creditor the best of both worlds.
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only if the creditor originally intended to use the collateral for leverage rather than collection purposes.
The BIA would make two significant procedural changes in secured creditors' rights in bankruptcy. Under the BRA, a debtor
has a variety of options in dealing with secured creditors: redeem
the collateral,' 40 surrender it to the secured creditor,' 4 ' reaffirm the
debt in whole or in part in order to retain the collateral, 4 2 or claim
the collateral as exempt and seek to avoid judicial or non-purchase
money liens against it. 14 The BRA in general imposes no time limits on the debtor for any of these options, at least not until well
into the proceeding.' In the meantime, while the debtor is deciding what to do with the secured creditor and the collateral, the

secured creditor is prevented by the automatic stay 45 from seeking
to obtain the collateral or otherwise putting pressure on the debtor

to act with respect to the collateral. This is a problem which

should be corrected, and the BIA seeks to accomplish that, albeit
imperfectly. The BIA would require the debtor to file a statement
describing what the debtor intends to do with collateral securing a
consumer debt within thirty days of filing a chapter 7 petition.1 46
140. 11 U.S.C. § 722.
141. See id. §§ 725, 1325(a)(5).
142. Id. § 524(c), (d).
143. Id. § 522(f)(2).
144. The debtor must reaffirm before the discharge is granted, 11 U.S.C. §
524(c)(1), although the debtor may extend the discharge in order to increase the
time for negotiating reaffirmations. INTERIM RULES, supra note 13, Rule 4002. In
general the other methods of dealing with collateral are not directly subject to
fixed time limits.
145. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). The creditor could, of course, file a complaint to lift
the stay. Id. § 362(d). BANKR. PROC., supra note 126, Rule 701(6). Such a complaint would be entitled to prompt resolution. 11 U.S.C. § 362(e).
146. S. 2000 § 7(a)(2). It would amend § 521 of the Bankruptcy Code to provide that if the debtor is an individual, he must file a statement of income and
expenses.
[I]f the debtor's schedule of assets and liabilities includes consumer
debts which are secured by property of the estate, the debtor shall file
and serve, within thirty days of the filing of a petition under chapter 7 of
this title but no later than five days before the first meeting of the creditors [under 11 U.S.C. § 341], . . . a statement expressing the debtor's
intention with respect to retention or surrender of the collateral .. .;
Id. (emphasis added). But see S. Rep. 446, supra note 1, at 40 (stating the requirement as 10 days). H.R. 4786 § 7(3) requires that the debtor file this information within 10 days after filing the petition. The Butler bill § 302(b) would make a
similar change to 11 U.S.C. § 521 by requiring the filing of a statement regarding
the debtor's intention with respect to collateral but with no time limit expressed.
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Then, at or before the creditors' meeting,14 7 the debtor must fulfill
these intentions by redeeming, surrendering the collateral, reaffirming the debt, or claiming the collateral as exempt. If the debtor
fails to accomplish this, the stay is lifted as to such collateral unless the court orders otherwise."'
The idea behind this proposal is sound. It simply forces the
consumer debtor to do in chapter 7 what is required by a chapter
13 plan: announce his/her intentions for dealing with secured creditors and their claims." 9 However, the statutory mechanics by
-which this is to be accomplished are weak. First, the BIA would
require the debtor to file the statement within thirty days of a
chapter 7 petition. 50 While involuntary petitions are rare in individual cases, they are neither illegal nor unknown.' 0 ' A debtor
should not be forced to file any statement of intention with respect
to collateral in a bankruptcy until it has been, in fact, determined
that there will be a bankruptcy. Therefore, the thirty days should
run from the date of the order for relief under chapter 7. Secondly,
the provision is limited to "consumer debts secured by property of
the estate.'

52

It would not therefore apply to many debts which

typically arise in consumer or quasi-consumer situations involving
individual debtors, such as where the debtor has personally guaranteed a business debt and has pledged personal assets as security. " Though such a debt would not fit within the definition of a
consumer debt,' 5 such a creditor would have a real need to know
147. See S.2000 § 7(a)(4); H.R. 4786 § 7(5).
148. Id.

149. S.2000 § 7(a)(2). Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), (5).

150. S. 2000 § 7(a)(2). The debtor must file the statement and serve it on the
trustee and the secured creditor within thirty days after the petition, but no later
than five days before the creditors' meeting which is held under 11 U.S.C. § 341.
Id. That meeting is to be held from twenty to forty days after the order for relief.
INTERIM RULES, supra note 13, Rule 2003(a). In a voluntary case, the petition acts
as the order for relief. 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 302(a). Thus, in a voluntary case, the fiveday period would often control over the thirty-day period.

151. See, e.g., In re Chong, 16.Bankr. 1 (Bankr. D. Hawaii 1980).
152. S. 2000 § 7(a)(2).
153. Such a debt is, of course, a common feature of the funding of small,
closely held business. Cf. In re Multiple Services Industries, Inc., 18 Bankr. 635

(Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1982); In re Harrold's Hatchery and Poultry Farms, Inc., 17
Bankr. 712 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1982); In re United Medical Research, Inc., 12

Bankr. 941 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981); Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Gibson, 7
Bankr. 437 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1980). The United States Small Business Administration is commonly the beneficiary of such an arrangement.
154. Such an obligation would not be a "consumer debt" under the BRA be-
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the debtor's intentions with respect to the debt and the collateral
to know how to proceed in the bankruptcy. In fact, virtually any
creditor with a secured claim, regardless of the source, against an
individual debtor would have a legitimate interest in knowing the
debtor's intentions in a chapter 7 proceeding. Thus, the focus of
the BIA in this provison should be on the nature of the debtor, not
the nature of the debt. The provision should be changed to require
any individual debtor in a chapter 7 proceeding to disclose his/her
intentions with respect to any secured claims within ten days after
the order for relief.
The requirement that the debtor fulfill his/her stated intentions with respect to secured claims before or at the meeting of
creditors is also unobjectionable if it is clear that such includes the
creditors' meeting or any continuation thereof. Also, the automatic
stay provision1" should be amended to make it clear that it does
not prohibit a creditor with a secured claim in a chapter 7 proceeding from contacting the debtor in order to pursue the debtor's
stated intentions with respect to the collateral.1"
One final point needs to be made regarding the unfortunate
wording of the BIA provision which deals with secured creditors'
rights in bankruptcy. One of the BIA options offered the debtor is

to "reaffirm debts secured by collateral. ' ' 157 For a partially secured

creditor, the total debt owed by the debtor consists of a secured
claim and an unsecured claim (the deficiency). 6 8 It should be
made clear that one of the options available to the debtor is to
offer a partial reaffirmation, i.e., a reaffirmation of the secured porcause it was not "incurred by an individual primarily for a personal, family, or
household purpose." 11 U.S.C. § 101(7).

155. Id. § 362.

156. The drafters of the BIA seem to have a different view on this point. In

discussing the proposed changes with respect to reaffirmation, the drafters have
stated: "The [reaffirmation] agreement must inevitably be voluntary because con-

tact between the debtor and creditor is otherwise prohibited by the automatic
stay. The debtor, therefore, has to initiate the contact with the creditor concern-

ing the preexisting debt." S. Rep. 446, supra note 1, at 22. This would seem to
mean that contact of an individual debtor by any creditor, including a secured
creditor with respect to the disposition of collateral, is prohibited by the auto-

matic stay. If that is the case, which it probably is under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3)-(6),
the BRA should be amended to permit a secured lender to initiate contact with

an individual debtor to determine what the debtor intends to do with the

collateral.

157. S. 2000 § 7(a)(2); H.R. 4786 § 7(3)(emphasis added).

158. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).
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tion of the claim. Under present law, such a partial reaffirmation
would require the consent of the creditor. 59 Nevertheless, the BIA
ought not to undermine the debtor's bargaining position in this regard by permitting the debtor to offer only a full reaffirmation at
the outset of the proceeding.
The second procedural change is one that becomes significant
only after the debtor is discharged. Under the BRA, the granting
of a discharge terminates the automatic stay against creditor collection efforts.1 60 However, the stay is replaced with a permanent
injunction against efforts to collect a discharged debt."" Problems
have arisen with secured creditors whose liens have not been
avoided during the bankruptcy proceeding and who have been unable to obtain possession of the collateral. Usually in such circumstances the collateral has been abandoned to the debtor who is in
possession of it after the discharge.' s" It is generally agreed that
the lien survives the bankruptcy even if the deficiency does not, so
that the creditor is able to get the collateral back after discharge. " However, it is unclear whether the creditor may seek to
recover the collateral without first asking the bankruptcy court to
4
lift the injunction barring creditor actions against the debtor.1
The BIA would solve this problem by creating an exception to the
permanent injunction against enforcement of creditor claims after
discharge to permit "enforcement of a lien that has not been
avoided."' 65 While the idea behind this provision is certainly commendable, the language is not. Once again, it represents a shift in
favor of creditors to the detriment of debtors.
As written, this provision would validate liens which a debtor
could have avoided in a bankruptcy proceeding but for some reason failed to do so. Suppose, for example, that the debtor at the
time of a chapter 7 proceeding owns real property worth $50,001,
subject to a first mortgage of $50,000 and a second mortgage of
159. See id. § 524(c). See, e.g., In re Schweitzer, 19 Bankr. 860 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Vinson, 5 Bankr. 32 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
160. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(C).
161. Id. § 524(a)(2), (3).
162. Id. § 554. But see id. § 725. See also id. § 522(c).
163. See id. § 506(d). See In re Weathers, 15 Bankr. 945 (Bankr. D. Kan.
1981); In re Breenley, 7 Bankr. 9 (Bankr. D. Del. 1980).
164. S.Rep. 446, supra note 1, at 21.
165. S. 2000 § 10(a)(3). The Butler bill, H.R. 7294 § 307(a), amends § 524 in
a structurally different way than S. 2000 but the proposed changes lead to the
same result.
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$25,000. In fact, the second mortgage is almost entirely an unsecured claim which ought to be discharged in full except for $1 in
the chapter 7.1" Under the BIA proposal, unless the debtor took
affirmative steps in the chapter 7 proceeding to have the second
mortgage deemed unsecured, any post discharge increase in equity
in the realty above the first mortgage would recreate the second
lien after the bankruptcy. The second mortgagee would thus be
permitted to reach the property despite the fact that all of the
claim except $1 was discharged in the bankruptcy. It is unclear
whether the same result would be reached if there were no equity
at all for the second mortgage in the bankruptcy. 6"
In effect, the BIA proposal would fix the grant of the discharge
as a deadline for a debtor or trustee to avoid a lien in whole or in
part.. Thereafter, even invalid liens could be enforced against the
debtor's property without interference from the bankruptcy court.
In order to avoid this inequitable result, this proposal should be
changed to provide that the permanent injunction does not prohibit a creditor from enforcing a lien after discharge except insofar
as the lien could have been avoided in whole or in part during the
course of the bankruptcy proceedings.
Reaffirmation
One of the more innovative aspects of the BRA was giving the
bankruptcy court jurisdiction in the area of reaffirmations.' The
166. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Under 11 U.S.C. § 523, this second mortgage is
not a debt that fits into the category of exceptions to discharge. 11 U.S.C. §
724(b) specifies that property of the estate is to be distributed to any holder of an

allowed claim secured by a lien in the property of the estate before distribution is
made to unsecured creditors.
167. In such circumstances, it would seem that there would be no "lien" as
such to survive bankruptcy. But see 11 U.S.C. § 506(d). See generally Schmid,
The Potential for Post-DischargeLien Survival: Problems Surrounding Sections
506(d) and 524(a) of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, 2 N. ILL. U.L. Rv. 285
(1982).
The BIA amendment would apparently permit a creditor secured by a nonpossessory, non-purchase money security interest in exempt household goods and
the like to proceed against the property after discharge should the debtor fail to
exercise the power to avoid such liens. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(0(2); cf. id. § 522(c).
See also In re Peterson, 26 Bankr. 942 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983); In re Montney, 8
Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 931 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982). But see Beneficial Finance
Co. of Va. v. Franklin, 26 Bankr. 636 (W.D. Va. 1983); In re Adkins, 7 Bankr. 325
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980).

168. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c), (d).
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old Bankruptcy Act was silent on the subject. Accordingly, the
matter was left to state law which offered little or no protection to
debtors in the matter. 1 9 As a result, debtors emerging from bankruptcy, often without advice of counsel, unknowingly wound up
forfeiting their discharge in whole or in substantial part by agreeing to pay much of a debt which could have been discharged in
bankruptcy. Of course, the problem was compounded by the fact
that the debtor was ineligible for another bankruptcy discharge for
six years after the original bankruptcy petition.""
The BRA solved the problem by putting the entire matter of
reaffirmation under the aegis of the bankruptcy court and bankruptcy law. In order for reaffirmation to be enforceable, it must be
obtained from the debtor before discharge. 71 Any reaffirmation is
rescindable for thirty days after it becomes enforceable.1 72 If the
debt being reaffirmed is a consumer debt owed by an individual
debtor not secured by realty, the reaffirmation, to be enforceable,
must be approved by the court. The court is to approve the reaffirmation only if satisfied that (1) the reaffirmation is in the debtor's
best interest and will not work a hardship on the debtor or the
debtor's family; (2) the reaffirmation represents a fair settlement of
a legitimate objection to the dischargeability of a claim; or (3) the
reaffirmation represents a fair price to pay for the redemption of
collateral under 11 U.S.C. § 722.17 In order to cement further the
bankruptcy court's control over the reaffirmation process, the individual debtor is required to attend a hearing at which the discharge is granted or denied, At that hearing, if the debtor wishes to
169. See Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U.S. 625 (1913); Allen & Co. v. Ferguson, 85
U.S. (18 Wall.) 1 (1873). See also Boshkoff, The Bankrupt's Moral Obligation to
Pay His Discharged Debts: A Conflict Between Contract Theory and Bankruptcy

Policy, 47

IND.

L.J. 36 (1971).

170. See former § 14(c)(5), 11 U.S.C. § 32(c)(5) (1976) (repealed 1979). See

generally supra note 17.

171. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1). Under the Interim Rules, the debtor, but only the

debtor, may continue the discharge for 45 days or more in order to negotiate reaffirmations. INTERIM RULES, supra note 13, Rule 4002.
172. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(2). It is entirely unclear when a reaffirmation becomes
"enforceable," particularly when there is a significant delay between the time of
the discharge hearing and when the first payment is due under the reaffirmation.

In such cases is it the time of court approval or the time when the first payment is
due? See In re Clements, 18 Bankr. 435 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1982) (reaffirmation

becomes enforceable at time of court approval, i.e., the discharge hearing held
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 524(d)).

173. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(4).
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reaffirm any debts, the court is to give the debtor a "Miranda
warning" that reaffirmations are not required and as to the effect
of a reaffirmation. If a consumer debt not secured by realty is being reaffirmed, the court decides at this same hearing whether to
1
approve the reaffirmation.

74

The BIA would work significant changes in this process, although the precise nature of some of these changes is less than
clear. The BIA would abolish the discharge hearing.7 5 However,
the "Miranda warnings" with respect to reaffirmations would still
be given, albeit somewhat less forcefully. This warning would be
given by the judge at the creditors' meeting, which the judge would
be permitted (required) to attend by the BIA. 1 6 The logic of this
change is that the debtor is better off getting such a warning early
on in the proceeding rather than later on at the time of discharge,
enabling the debtor to deal intelligently with creditors in the reaffirmation process.17 7 This idea makes eminent sense, and, if the
bankruptcy judge is put back into the creditors' meeting, probably
should be enacted.
The other changes which the BIA would make in the reaffirmation process are more difficult to follow. The BIA would continue the requirement that a reaffirmation be entered into before
the discharge. However, the rule that a reaffirmation be rescindable for thirty days after it becomes enforceable would be changed
to provide that a reaffirmation would be rescindable at any time
before discharge or within sixty days after it is filed with the court,
17
whichever occurs later. s
174. Id. § 524(d).
175. See S. 2000 § 10(c); cf. 11 U.S.C. § 524(d). All of the other proposed bills
would also abolish the discharge hearing.
176. See S. 2000 § 5. See S. 2000 § 10(b)(3) for the modified Miranda warnings. See also H.R. 4786 § 10(c). For a discussion of the modifications of present
11 U.S.C. §§ 341-343, see supra notes 87-98 and accompanying text.

177. See S. Rep. 446, supra note 1, at 22.
178. S. 2000 § 10(b)(3). This provision has a number of interesting features.
First, it would appear that either the debtor or the other party could rescind the
reaffirmation within the statutory periods. Second, it would require written notice
of reaffirmation to the creditor. This would seem to be unobjectionable. Third, it
does not apply to a consumer debt secured by real property. While presumably
this means that the reaffirmation rules do not apply to any reaffirmation of a real
property mortgage-be it a first, second, or third mortgage-it is unclear whether
the provision would apply, for example, to the reaffirmation of a second mortgage
which is unsecured because the debtor has no equity in the property beyond the
first mortgage. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 506. The BIA would continue the present deadline

of the granting of the discharge as the last time that the debtor can enter into an
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While the time periods fixed for rescission are clear, the process of court approval of reaffirmations is not. The BIA would repeal the provisions of the BRA providing for judicial approval of
reaffirmations and setting out the standards for such approval.1 79
Yet the rescission provision quoted above clearly contemplates judicial approval of some reaffirmations. The question is what reaffirmations are subject to judicial approval and what standards are
to be applied. As to what debts, the fact that the BIA excludes one
type of debt specifically from the reaffirmation process (consumer
debts owed by individuals secured by realty), could mean that all
other debts owed by all other debtors are included under the doctrine of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.180 However, the statute, as amended by the BIA, does not even hint at what standards
are to be used in the reaffirmation process. These defects as to
debts and standards should be remedied before the BIA is enacted.
Actually, no reason appears for changing the present standards. If
the purpose of the BIA is to eliminate all judicial scrutiny of reaffirmations as the House version apparently does,1 s1 then a different
enforceable reaffirmation. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1). But see INTERIM RULES,
supra note 13, Rule 4004. Of course, nothing in the Bankruptcy Code prohibits a
debtor from voluntarily paying a discharged debt after bankruptcy. The preference provision only avoids pre-petition payments on unsecured debts. 11 U.S.C. §
547. 11 U.S.C. dealing with post-petition transfers only applies to post-petition
transfers of property of the estate. Most property acquired by a chapter 7 debtor
after a petition is filed does not become property of the estate. Id. § 541.
179. S. 2000 § 10(b)(2). See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(4). However, as noted in the
text immediately hereafter, the BIA contemplates that the court will review the
reaffirmation. If the court does not reject it within 60 days after it is filed with the
court, the reaffirmation is deemed effective from the date of filing. If the court
rejects it, all payments which have been made by the debtor under the reaffirmation must be returned by the creditor. The creditor is to hold any payments received under the reaffirmation in trust until the 60-day period has run. The court
may only reject the reaffirmation after notice and hearing. S. 2000 § 10(b)(3). Cf.
11 U.S.C. § 102(1). Presumably, if the court fails to act during the 60 days after
the reaffirmation is filed with the court, the reaffirmation would become effective
without judicial review. The Senate Report does suggest that the standard for
approval of reaffirmations is whether the performance of the agreement will work
an "undue hardship" on the debtor. S. Rep. 446, supra note 1, at 42. If this is in
fact the case, it is unclear what change this would work in the present requirement that to be approved, a reaffirmation must not work an undue hardship on
the debtor or the debtor's family and must be in the debtor's best interests, unless certain other criteria are met. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(4).
180. "The inclusion of one is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAW DicTIONARY 687 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
181. See H.R. 4786 § 10(b)(2), (3). The Senate bill seems to contemplate
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issue exists. It can hardly be concluded, without much more study
than has gone into the BIA, that debtors do not need protection in
the reaffirmation process. Avoiding judicial scrutiny of reaffirmation agreements would be a significant advantage to creditors.
Thus, it would not be hard to conclude that such a change would
be of significant disadvantage to debtors and ought to be implemented only after careful examination and consideration demonstrate that it is appropriate.
Preferences
A preference consists of six elements: 82
1. A transfer of the property of the debtor 8
2. to or for the benefit of a creditor
3. on account of antecedent debt
4. while the debtor was insolvent 8

3

mandatory judicial review of reaffirmations by saying that the court "shall" review the agreement. S1.2000 § 10(b)(3).
It is anticipated that, in the vast majority of cases, the obligations of the
court may be adequately discharged by brief inquiries to counsel and the
debtor. Where the debtor and the debtor's counsel are in agreement that
the execution of the agreement is beneficial to the debtor, the presumption should be in favor of ratification of the agreement.
S. Rep. 446, supra note 1, at 42. However, that same provision appears to make
the reaffirmation binding, subject to whatever recission rights the debtor might
have should the court fail to review the agreement within 60 days of the time that
it is filed with the court. The debtor could only rescind in such circumstances if
the 60 days ran before the debtor received the discharge. Of course, either the
debtor or creditor could bring a mandamus action to require judicial review
within the 60-day period. To say the least, such an action is highly unlikely. The
Senate bill should be amended to provide at a minimum that no reaffirmation is
effective unless and until it has in fact been reviewed by the court.
182. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b). The right to set aside a preference is generally reserved to the trustee in both chapter 7 and chapter 13 proceedings. See H. Rep.
595, supra note 8, at 372, CONG. NEws at 6328; S. Rep. 989, supra note 8, at 87,
CONG. NEws at 5873. See also In re Davis, 22 Bankr. 644 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1982);
In re Walls, 17 Bankr. 701 (Bankr. S.D.W. Va. 1982); In re Lumpkins, 12 Bankr.
44 (Bankr. R.I. 1981). However, a debtor can seek to set aside certain involuntary
transfers of exempt property. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(g), (h). Cf. Redmond v. Tuttle,
698 F.2d 414 (10th Cir. 1983).
183. Property for these purposes includes both exempt and nonexempt property. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 522, 541.
184. For preference purposes the debtor is rebuttably presumed to be insolvent for the 90 days preceding the petition. 11 U.S.C. § 547(f). "Insolvent" means
the fair value of nonexempt assets is less than the amount of liabilities. Id. §
101(26).
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5. within ninety days before the petition, 185
6. enabling the creditor who received it to receive more
than that creditor would have received had the transfer
not occurred and had the debtor's assets been liquidated in
a chapter 7 proceeding.
These six elements make up a preferential transfer which usually
may be avoided by a trustee under the BRA without any additional proof.' These six elements also made up, with slight variations which are unimportant for this discussion, a preferential
transfer under the old Bankruptcy Act. 187 However, the old Bankruptcy Act drew a distinction between a preferential transfer and a
voidable preference; in order to avoid a preferential transfer, the
trustee had to prove one more element, that the creditor receiving
the transfer knew or had reason to believe that the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer. 88 Congress very specifically
dropped this requirement in the BRA except in rare instances, 89
as it was difficult for the trustee to prove the subjective state of
mind of the creditor at the time of the transfer. Also, to promote
the philosophy of fair and equal treatment of creditors in bankruptcy, it was best to have an objective preference provision with
objective exceptions to validate certain routine transactions. 9 0
The BRA sought, in effect, to end the game of musical chairs
at least in consumer cases, under which only those creditors who
were unpaid at the time of the petition would bear the cost of the
bankruptcy. Under the old Bankruptcy Act, those who were "innocently" paid in the immediate pre-bankruptcy period could not be
185. If the creditor who received the payment is an insider, the period of
vulnerability is extended to one year preceding the petition. See 11 U.S.C. §
547(b)(4)(B). See also id. § 101(25).
186. If the creditor receiving the payment was an insider and the transfer
took place between 91 days and one year before the petition, then, and only then,
the trustee must also show that the creditor receiving the payment had reasonable
cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer. In such
circumstances, the trustee must also assume the burden of proof on the question
of the debtor's insolvency at the time of the transfer, since the presumption of
insolvency for preference purposes exists only for the 90 days preceding the petition. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(b)(4)(B), 547(f).
187. See former § 60(a), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1976) (repealed 1979). See generally supra note 17. Actually, one difference is significant. Under the former Bankruptcy Act, there was no presumption of insolvency for preference purposes.
188. See former § 60(b), 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1976) (repealed 1979).
189. See supra note 186.
190. See H. Rep. 595, supra note 8, at 177-79, CONG. NEWs at 6138-40.
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forced to share those payments with those caught up in the
debtor's bankruptcy. Under the BRA the question of the creditor's
"innocence" at the time of the payment is irrelevant. Regardless of
the perceived equities of any particular creditor's case, all those
who have been paid preferentially in the immediate pre-bankruptcy period must share their payment with fellow creditors. The
equity of the individual claimant must yield to the collective equity of the creditors as a whole in the spirit of fair and equal treatment of creditors.
The BIA would change this, returning to the old Act system
by requiring the trustee in order to set aside a transfer as a preference, to prove one additional element-that the creditor who received the payment had reasonable cause to believe that the
debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer. 191 The purpose of
the change is yet another blatant attempt to protect consumer
finance lenders, this time at the expense of other creditors, by
preventing the trustee from recovering installment payments made
by the debtor in the ninety days preceding a petition.192 Absent
any investigation of the finance company's state of mind, such payments, even if made in the ordinary course of the debtor's financial
affairs, would be clearly recoverable by the trustee unless the creditor was fully secured.19 Even in a consumer case, the size of such
routine installment payments could well be significant. The BIA
proposal in this regard is ill-conceived and should not be enacted
for several reasons.
First, the focus of the proposal is strictly on the creditor's
state of mind; the debtor's state of mind is irrelevant. Thus, there
will be a temptation for a debtor on the eve of bankruptcy to use
his/her nonexempt assets to pay a few favored creditors in full or
191. S. 2000 § 11(3).
192. The Senate Report on the BIA takes the position that "the burden has

been shifted too far and now unfairly discriminates against the good faith creditor." S. Rep. 446, supra note 1, at 24. The report then goes on to take the position
that this cannot be justified because the recoveries under the relaxed preference
provision of the Bankruptcy Code are not being distributed to creditors, but instead are being eaten up by administrative expenses, particularly in individual
cases. Id. No evidence is cited for this proposition, and logic does not mandate
this conclusion. It could be argued that elimination of the requirement that the

trustee prove the creditor's state of mind at the time of the transfer reduces the
expense of litigating preferential transfers from the point of view of the debtor's
estate. Thus, the administrative expense of the proceeding is reduced, necessarily

increasing the dividend to creditors.

193. See, e.g., Barash v. Public Finance Corp., 658 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981).
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significant part, leaving those creditors whom the debtor does not
care for holding the bag. Unless the trustee could show that the
creditors knew what the debtor was doing, the trustee would not
be able to recover any of the payments. This scenario is hardly farfetched. Trustees have great difficulty showing that even those
creditors with a close blood or financial relationship to the debtor
had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent when
s/he paid them."" In addition, the debtor is far better off to devote
his/her assets in these circumstances to the payment of those creditors partially secured by assets which the debtor wishes to keep,
as such payments will reduce the amount of the debt and thus
make even a partial reaffirmation that much easier to negotiate.
Second, it must be remembered what the trustee would have
to prove under the BIA. "Insolvent" in the bankruptcy context
means that the fair value of the debtor's nonexempt assets does
not exceed the amount of the debtor's liabilities."5 ' It is a balance
sheet test. The fact that the debtor is insolvent in the equity sense
and is not paying his/her debts as they come due, does not necessarily mean that the debtor is insolvent in the bankruptcy sense."'
Thus, the fact that the debtor has been behind in payments, or
even that the creditor has had to extract the payment in question,
would not necessarily mean that the creditor had reason to believe
that the debtor had a negative net worth at the time of the payment. 1 7 The BIA-proposed change would make preferences difficult to recover and would promote litigation and discourage settlement. Creditors would try to retain their advantage by succeeding
on the subjective issue of the creditor's state of mind at the time of
the transfer."'
194. See, e.g., In re Gruber Bottling Works, 16 Bankr. 348 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1982).

195. 11 U.S.C. § 101(26).

196. The Bankruptcy Code itself recognizes the difference between equity
and balance sheet insolvency. In most places it calls for proof of balance sheet
insolvency, 11 U.S.C. § 101(26), without requiring proof of equity insolvency.

However, one of the grounds for approving an involuntary petition under either
chapter 7 or chapter 11 is proof of equity insolvency. Id. § 303(h)(1). In such

circumstances, the petitioning creditors are not required to prove that the debtor
is also insolvent in the balance sheet sense.
197. See Cusick v. Second Nat'l Bank, 115 F.2d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Lang v.
First Nat'l Bank, 215 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1954).

198. The requirement that the trustee prove a preferred creditor knew or had
reason to believe that the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer in order
to avoid it, led to extensive litigation under the old Bankruptcy Act. See 3 W.
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The third reason for rejecting the BIA proposal is that it is not
limited to consumer debtors and/or creditors. Instead, it would
also apply to business reorganizations and liquidations. If the purpose of the proposed BIA change in the preference process is to
insulate pre-petition installment payments in the ordinary course
of a consumer debtor's financial affairs from attack by the trustee
as a preference, a specific exception should be added to the preference provision to protect such payments.199 If, on the other hand,
60.52-.57, at 1051-91 (14th ed. 1977) and the
literally hundreds of cases collected therein. There is no reason to believe that
creditors would be any less recalcitrant about returning preferences received
under the Bankruptcy Code. In fact, if the BIA proposal in this regard were enacted, the trustee's burden in setting aside preferences under the Bankruptcy
Code would be more onerous than it was under the old Bankruptcy Act. That is
because under the old Bankruptcy Act, the trustee could set aside liens obtained
by unsecured creditors by means of legal proceedings in the immediate pre-bankruptcy period without proof that the creditor obtaining the lien knew or had reason to believe that the debtor was insolvent at the time that the lien was obtained. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 67(a), codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. § 107 (1976) (see supra note 17). Under the Bankruptcy Code such liens
have been avoidable as preferences, and thus the Bankruptcy Code contains no
equivalent of former § 67(a). See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (Supp. V 1981). If the BIA
proposal were enacted, the trustee would have to show creditor knowledge of insolvency in order to be able to avoid judicial liens obtained by unsecured creditors
during the 90 days preceding a petition.
The drafters of the BIA also gave consideration to abolishing the presumption that the debtor was insolvent during the 90 days preceding a petition for
preference purposes. S. Rep. 446, supra note 1, at 24. They decided not to further
increase the difficulties facing a trustee in seeking to avoid a preference by deciding to leave the presumption of insolvency in the preference provision. 11 U.S.C. §
547(f). They did indicate that the presumption would be the subject of further
examination in the future. S. Rep. 446, supra note 1, at 24. It seems worth noting
that the doubts expressed about the presumption of insolvency, as well as the
suggestion that the trustee show that the creditor had reason to believe that the
debtor was insolvent at the time of payment, seem directly contrary to the basic
philosophy of the drafters of the BIA, at least in consumer cases. The underlying
premise of the BIA is that consumer debtors' assets are almost always much less
than the amount of their liabilities, that creditors are always aware of this when
they lend, and, therefore, creditors should be permitted to look to debtors' future
incomes for satisfaction of their claims even in bankruptcy. It would appear that
the preference provision of the Bankruptcy Code, as presently constituted, accords with the consumer lenders' perceptions of the realities of consumer finance.
199. Of course, Congress has shown that it knows how to identify transfers
which are in fact preferential but which for reasons of social or commercial policy
should be insulated from the trustee's power to avoid preferences. See 11 U.S.C. §
547(c). Routine consumer installment payments could be so protected by a relatively minor change in § 547(c)(2) without getting involved in the overkill apCOLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
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the purpose of this proposal is to validate virtually all pre-petition
payments obtained by those unsecured or partially secured creditors who were aggressive enough to obtain such payments, the proposal should be rejected. It represents a fundamental change in a
basic philosophy of bankruptcy, fair and equal treatment of creditors, and substitutes a new philosophy, that of the creditor race:
first in time, first in right. By validating aggressive creditor collection efforts, the BIA would encourage creditors to push debtors to
and over the brink. This, in fact, would be contrary to one of the
implied purposes of the BIA as it would, in the end, increase
rather than decrease the actual incidence of bankruptcy. 0 0
Redemption of Collateral
One of the innovative provisions of the BRA is 11 U.S.C. §
722. This section permits a chapter 7 debtor to redeem tangible
personal property collateral used primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes from a secured creditor if the property is of no
value to unsecured creditors because it is exempt or there is little
or no equity. The purpose behind the provision is debtor protection; it is meant to protect debtors from over-reaching by creditors
secured by essential household goods. Absent section 722, a creditor with a relatively large claim and a relatively small amount of
security in household goods which the debtor needs to keep could
refuse to allow the debtor to redeem those goods unless the debtor
reaffirmed the entire debt, both the secured and unsecured portions. This, of course, would put the debtor at a significant disadvantage in the bargaining process since the lien, though not the
deficiency, would survive the bankruptcy process, and the creditor
could repossess even after bankruptcy. The BRA sought to remedy
proach of the BIA proposal. See Barash v. Public Finance Corp., 658 F.2d 504
(7th Cir. 1981).
200. In fact, it could be argued that the easing of the trustee's burden of

proof with respect to preferences may well reduce the number of bankruptcy
filings. Debtors who have made preferential payments to unknowing creditors presumably want those payments to stand. Therefore, such debtors are unlikely to
file voluntary petitions. Similarly, creditors who have been receiving payments

from a debtor without knowing that the debtor is in financial trouble would be
more likely to accept some sort of out of court settlement when they discover that
the debtor is insolvent if they fear that they will have to return what they have
already received should the debtor be forced into bankruptcy. See also 11 U.S.C.
§ 305(a)(1) (court may dismiss or suspend proceedings if the interests of creditors

and debtor are better served, i.e., out-of-court arrangement).
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this by allowing the debtor to redeem the collateral by paying the
creditor the value of the collateral. If the debtor does this, the
creditor must surrender the lien and cannot hold out for the full
amount of the debt. There is, however, a major defect in the chapter 7 redemption process. A debtor can redeem only for cash. If the
collateral is of any significant value, it is unlikely that a bankrupt
debtor will be able to produce sufficient cash to redeem it. However, the secured creditor cannot be forced to take the value of the
collateral in installment payments even if spread over a reasonable
period of time at reasonable interest rates.210
The BIA would provide only a limited cure of this defect and,
in fact, would weaken the debtor's bargaining position with respect
to certain lenders secured by essential household goods and similar
property.210 The existing chapter 7 redemption provision would remain unchanged. However, an additional clause would be added to
section 722 which would allow the debtor to redeem property from
a non-purchase money security interest if such property is (1)
goods held for personal, family, or household use; (2) implements,
professional books or tools of trade; or (3) professionally prescribed
health aids. The debtor would be able to redeem this property either for cash or for installment payments spread over a period of
time up to five years; however, the payments must be for the
"value of a claim secured" by such collateral.20
This, in sum, represents a substitution for the 11 U.S.C. §
522(f)(2) right to clear non-purchase money security interests from
certain exempt personalty, which the BIA would repeal."" The
BIA proposal is, of course, less generous to debtors as it permits
the debtor only to redeem the collateral with cash or installment
payments. It would not permit the debtor to avoid such nonpurchase money security interest. The BIA proposal, however, is
201. In re Bell, 700 F.2d 1053 (6th Cir. 1983); In re Davis, 20 Bankr. 212

(C.D. 111. 1982). Thus, the debtor who cannot come up with the cash to redeem
collateral and still wants to keep the property is left with little choice in chapter 7
except reaffirming the entire debt, assuming that the creditor is amenable to a
reaffirmation. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c).
202. S. 2000 § 13(2). See also

H.R. 4786 § 13(b).
203. S. 2000 § 13(2).
204. Id. § 8(b). The BIA would permit the debtor to avoid non-purchase
money security interests in household goods and the like, tools of trade and the
like, as well as professionally prescribed health aids, whether exempt or not, if the

debtor does not have sufficient anticipated income to redeem the collateral and
loss of the property would work an undue hardship on the debtor or the debtor's
dependants. Id. § 13(c).
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not limited to exempt personal property as is section 522(f)(2) of
the-BRA. Although that appears at first blush to be a concession to
debtors, in application it is not likely to be of much benefit. First,
while it appears that the debtor is required to pay off in cash or
installments only the value of the secured portion of the creditor's
claim, the statute would be more precise if it required the debtor
to pay the value of the collateral. The reference to the "claim" is at
least ambiguous. 208 Secondly, although the right applies to exempt

and nonexempt collateral alike, with respect to nonexempt collat-

eral, the right will be of significance only when there is no equity in
the property. If there is any significant equity in nonexempt property, the trustee is unlikely to be willing to abandon it. Instead, the
trustee will presumably sell the property for cash to distribute to
unsecured creditors. 20 6 Thirdly, there is no logical reason why this

right to an installment redemption should be limited to non-

purchase money security interests in certain described personal

property. All a partially secured creditor can obtain from the collateral is the value of the collateral. The partially secured creditor
is left with an unsecured claim for the deficiency.20 7 Such a creditor should not care if the value of that collateral is paid in cash or
in installment payments with a present value equal to the value of
the collateral. 2 0 8 Assuming the concept of calculation of present

205. 11 U.S.C. § 722 of the BRA refers to the "allowed secured claim" of the
creditor. There would seem to be no reason not to continue to use that language.

See 11 U.S.C. § 506.
206. The redemption right exists only in chapter 7 cases. Id. § 103(b). In such
cases, the trugtee is ordinarily to liquidate the assets of the estate. Id. § 704. However, in certain circumstances, the trustee may abandon property of the estate.
The trustee is only to abandon property which is of inconsequential value to the
estate or which would be burdensome to the estate. Id. § 554. Of course, if the
trustee did sell collateral in which the estate had an equity, the secured creditor
would be paid in full from the proceeds. Id. §§ 506, 724(b). Therefore, debtors will
almost inevitably be dealing with partially secured creditors in the redemption
situation, making it even more important that the provision make clear that the
debtor only be required to pay value equivalent to the secured portion of the
claim in redemption. See supra note 205. There would, however, be one fairly
common situation where the debtor would be dealing with a fully secured creditor
under the redemption provision. That is the situation where there was an equity
in the property above the amount of the secured claim, but where that equity was
exempt. In such circumstances the trustee would likely abandon the property.
207. 11 U.S.C. § 506. This is true whether the security interest is purchase
money or non-purchase money.
208. In effect, as to such a creditor, the chapter 7 proceeding has been turned
into a chapter 13 proceeding. Cf. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322, 1325. Perhaps a creditor
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value is valid, the above economic analysis is correct whether the
creditor's claim was purchase money or non-purchase money, in realty or personalty. Therefore, this provision should be changed to
permit the individual debtor to redeem any collateral which the
trustee abandons from any kind of unavoidable lien, purchase
money or non-purchase money, 0 9 on an installment basis over a
reasonable period of time, not to exceed five years. This would
seem to implement the primary purpose of the BIA by giving creditors with secured claims against individual debtors access to what
it is that they want, the debtor's future income, rather than the
asset which constitutes the collateral.
CHAPTER

13 CHANGES

In conjunction with the concept of a mandatory chapter 13
for consumer debtors who can pay a substantial portion of the
debts, 10 the BIA also proposes to make significant changes in
chapter 13 proceedings. These changes are obviously intended to
force debtors to make significant payments to creditors in chapter
13 proceedings in order to receive a discharge, as well as to close
other perceived loopholes which creditor interests believe exist in
favor of the debtor in present chapter 13 proceedings.
Co-Debtor Provisions
For a lender to require of a debtor, in addition to or in lieu of
forced to take a redemption in installments should be given some of the protections which such creditor might get in chapter 13. Thus, the creditor might have
the protection of payments routed through some standing trustee. Obviously, the
creditor should continue to have a lien in the collateral until all payments have
been made under the redemption. In addition to the normal chapter 13 protections, such a creditor should be protected against the deterioration in the value of
the collateral by being given something equivalent to adequate protection over
the life of the redemption. That way, if the debtor defaults, the creditor will not
be harmed by virtue of the fact that the debtor was permitted to redeem property
from a lien in installments. See id. §§ 361, 507(b).
209. This should not only include all consensual security interests, but both
statutory and judicial liens as well. See id. § 101(27), (37), (38).
210. See supra text accompanying notes 37-86. It is important to note that
the term "mandatory chapter 13" is not synonymous with "involuntary chapter
13." The BIA does not provide for either an involuntary chapter 13 petition or an
involuntary transfer of a chapter 7 case to chapter 13. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 303, 706.
An involuntary chapter 13 proceeding would probably violate constitutional
prohibitions against involuntary servitude. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. See also
S. Rep. 446, supra note 1, at 59.

[1982:11

BANKRUPTCY IMPROVEMENTS ACT

security, that another person guarantee payment of the loan
should the debtor default is a common feature of consumer financing. This other person, who is typically a close friend or relative of
the debtor, agrees to cosign the loan as a favor ("an accommodation") to the primary debtor who receives and uses the entire proceeds of the loan. The cosigner receives nothing for his/her guarantee.2 1' As long as the primary debtor pays the loan in accordance
with its original terms, the cosigner is unaffected by the entire
transaction. However, if the primary debtor defaults, the cosigner
must pay the debt and winds up with a right to collect from the
primary debtor.2 1 2
This common consumer financing arrangement has proven to
be a problem when the primary debtor's default is occasioned by
or accompanied by the filing of a bankruptcy proceeding. Of
course, the debtor's discharge in any type of bankruptcy proceed15
ing is personal to the debtor and does not excuse co-debtors.
Thus, the co-debtor remains liable for any unpaid balance of the
creditor's claim against the debtor.
However, even when the primary debtor merely sought to use
bankruptcy to obtain an extension of time in which to pay the debt
in full by filing a petition under former chapter X1112 1 and proposing a 100% plan, creditors could not be forced to grant an extension to consumer cosigners. Any stay of creditor actions was personal to the debtor and would not prevent a creditor from pursuing
1
cosigners during the pending of the chapter XIII proceeding. '
211. If the consigner, rather than the chapter 13 debtor, received the consid-

eration which gave rise to the creditor's claim, the co-debtor stay to be discussed

in this part of the article is to be terminated. See 11 U.S.C. § 1301(c)(1). The codebtor stay does not apply at all if the cosigner became liable in the ordinary
course of the cosigner's business, e.g., if the cosigner is a professional surety. Id. §
1301(a)(1).
212. This right over against the debtor is recognized in bankruptcy within
certain limits which are not important for this discussion. See id. § 509. The cosigner really is a contingent creditor in the bankruptcy. Id. § 101(4), (9), (11).
213. See id. § 524(e).
214. Id. §§ 601-676 (1976) (repealed 1979).
215. See 5 W. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1301.01 (15th ed. 1982).
See also Schraer v. G.A.C. Finance Corp., 408 F.2d 891 (6th Cir. 1969); In re
Lancaster, 38 F. Supp. 318 (W.D. Mo. 1941). "Congress was informed that many

Chapter XIII plans failed or were never even filed due to the indirect pressures
exerted on the principal Chapter XIII debtor through co-debtors against whom

creditors remain free to proceed." Bankruptcy Act Revision, Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 3, 1324 (1976).
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The creditor could not be forced to take delayed payment in full
under the chapter XIII plan in lieu of its right to demand immediate payment in full from a cosigner outside of the bankruptcy
forum.
The BRA corrected this problem. The filing of a chapter 13
proceeding automatically stays most actions to enforce claims
against the debtor personally and the debtor's property."16 It also
stays efforts to collect debts from the debtor's co-debtors if those
co-debtors are individuals who, in a nonbusiness transaction,
cosigned on a consumer debt for the chapter 13 debtor with the
consideration going to the chapter 13 debtor.11 7 The purpose of the
co-debtor stay was to allow the debtor to force the creditor to leave
the co-debtor alone while the debtor pays the debt under the chapter 13 plan.
The BRA co-debtor stay provision was a new idea. It has
proven to be less than perfect. The BIA would make several significant changes in the treatment of co-debtors in chapter 13. The
BRA stays actions against co-debtors only to the extent that the
debtor proposes to pay the debt under the plan. Thus, if the
debtor proposes to pay only sixty percent of a debt in chapter 13, a
creditor may go against a cosigner for the balance. 1i However, the
creditor must first secure the permission of the bankruptcy court
before pursuing the co-debtor, in a proceeding to lift the co-debtor
stay. 19 The BIA would provide a simpler procedure to creditors
who believe that they have a right to pursue a chapter 13 debtor's
co-debtors despite the pendency of the proceeding. It would permit
the creditor to give notice of its intention to pursue a cosigner to
both the chapter 13 debtor and the co-debtor. If neither files a
written objection with the bankruptcy court within ten days, the
co-debtor stay is automatically lifted as to such creditor.2 0
The reasoning behind the BIA proposal is sound. The procedure for lifting the co-debtor stay in appropriate cases should be
216. See 11 U.S.C. § 362.

217. See id. § 1301.
218. See id. § 1301(c)(2). In re Laska, 20 Bankr. 675 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1982).
219. 11 U.S.C. § 1301(c). Under Bankruptcy Rule 701, a proceeding to lift a
stay is an adversary proceeding requiring the filing of a complaint rather than a
motion. BANKR. PROC., supra note 126, Rule 701(6). This rule is applied to proceedings to lift the co-debtor stay as well. See, e.g., In re Grigsby, .13 Bankr. 409
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981).
220. S. 2000 § 16. See also H.R. 4786 § 16(c).
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informal and provide for a quick resolution. However, the process
should be tightened to prevent abuses. The BIA proposal would
permit creditors to send form notices of intent to go against cosigners in every single chapter 13 involving a co-debtor immediately upon the filing of a petition, without regard to whether
grounds for lifting the co-debtor stay exist. The creditor would suffer no sanction except the price of a postage stamp. The debtor
would then be forced to go to the bankruptcy court to seek a codebtor stay. The BIA proposal should be changed to require that
notice be served on the debtor and co-debtor and be filed with the
bankruptcy court. The notice should specify the grounds for lifting
the stay. This would bring rules with respect to the good faith of
" ' Should the debtor or co-debtor fail to repleadings into play. 22
spond to the notice within ten days, the co-debtor stay would be
automatically lifted as to such creditor. However, it should also be
provided that should the court find that the notice was filed in bad
faith, the creditor will have to pay the debtor's or co-debtor's attorney's fees for preparing and filing a response."'
The other problem which has arisen with respect to co-debtors
in chapter 13 involves the treatment under the plan of creditors
who have general unsecured claims against the debtor which have
been guaranteed by the debtor's relatives or friends. While the
right to proceed against such a co-debtor does not give the creditor
security in the sense of a lien,22 8 it does give such a creditor considerable leverage in the negotiation process. Often, in order to prevent the creditor from enforcing the guarantee, the debtor is willing to pay such creditor in full. Unless the debtor is proposing to
pay all general unsecured creditors in full under the plan, the only
practical approach is to create a separate class of creditors, such as
"those unsecured creditors holding notes cosigned by the debtor's
friends or relatives," and to propose under the plan to pay such
class in full and pay other general unsecured creditors a lesser percentage. 22 4 Although classification of creditors is permitted in
221. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
222. Cf. 11 U.S.C. §§ 303(i)(2), 523(d).

223. Such a creditor has no "charge against or interest in property to secure

payment" of the debt. Id. § 101(28).

224. In general, nonpriority unsecured creditors need only be offered pay-

ments under a chapter 13 plan with a present value equal to what such creditors

would have gotten had the debtor opted to pursue a chapter 7 proceeding in lieu

of a chapter 13. Id. § 1325(a)(4). However, the precise meaning of this standard is
the subject of great dispute. See infra text accompanying notes 232-56.
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chapter 13 plans,"2 ' bankruptcy courts have had much difficulty
determining whether a separation of cosigned claims from the rest
of the general unsecured claims is a permissible or reasonable classification.2

6

The BIA would eliminate this problem by specifically

permitting claims involving co-debtors to be treated differently
under a chapter 13 plan from other unsecured claims. 227
The BIA proposal is a sound idea if claims
against co-debtors
are to continue to survive bankruptcy. A creditor holding a note
cosigned by a friend or relative of the debtor is in a much better
bargaining position with regard to reaffirmation in chapter 7 or extracting payment in full in chapter 13. The debtor will be tempted
to devote available resources towards satisfying such a creditor.
This process deprives the rest of the unsecured creditors of access
to those resources. The Bankruptcy Code recognized the fact that
a debtor will be naturally desirous of protecting close relatives
from the adverse consequences of a bankruptcy proceeding. It
could certainly be argued that allowing a creditor to use the leverage of a cosigned obligation in consumer cases is contrary to both
the fresh start and the fair and equal treatment of creditors philosophies of bankruptcy law.22 s Apparently Congress has the power to

eliminate that leverage by discharging both the chapter 7 and 13
debior's obligations and the cosigner's obligation in a bankruptcy
225. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(3).
226. See, e.g., Barnes v. Whelan, 689 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1982); In re Cook,
26 Bankr. 187 (D.N.M. 1982); In re Vanleeuween, 17 Bankr. 189 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1982); In re Kovich, 4 Bankr. 403 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1980); In re Sutherland, 3 Bankr. 420 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1980); In re Iacovoni, 2 Bankr. 256 (Bankr.
D. Utah 1980).
No problem would exist in the extraordinary case where the cosigned claim is
entitled to priority since priority unsecured claims must be paid in full under a
chapter 13 plan anyway. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a)(2), 507(a). In addition, even if
the cosigned debt were not entitled to priority, the debtor could pay it whatever
percentage general unsecured creditors were getting under the plan and then,
before discharge, reaffirm any unpaid balance on the cosigned claim. Assuming
that the court would approve such a reaffirmation of a consumer debt, that may
serve to mollify the creditor and keep it from going after the co-debtor. See id. §
103(a), 524(c), (d). However, the Bankruptcy Code would not seem to allow the
debtor to force the creditor to take something less than payment in full under the
plan and accept the reaffirmation in lieu of the creditor's right to go against the
cosigner for amounts unpaid under the plan alone. See 11 U.S.C. § 1301(c)(2); In
re Laska, 20 Bankr. 675 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982).
227. See S. 2000, § 18(b); see also H.R. 4786 § 18(b).
228. See Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18 (1970); Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S.
374 (1966); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
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proceeding.2 29 This author would like to see that done for individual cosigners or consumer debts where the proceeds of the loan
were given primarily to the debtor in the bankruptcy proceeding
and where the cosigner received no consideration for the guarantee. However, such a development seems unrealistic given the state
of the economy and the present pro-creditor bent of Congress.
Therefore, the BIA proposed solution specifically allowing for separate classification of co-debtor claims seems less desirable but at
least an improvement over the present situation.
However, the BIA proposal as presently drafted is too broad.
It would permit separate classification of any obligation involving a
co-debtor. This would include business obligations owed by a
debtor from a failed partnership, 3 0 as well as obligations guaranteed by professional sureties. Neither of these seems appropriate
for separate classification in chapter 13. The right to separate classification should be limited to consumer debts cosigned by individproceeds,
ual co-debtors where the debtor, having received the
23

gave the cosigner no consideration for the guarantee. '

229. Such a change probably could not be applied to debts in existence at the
time of the amendment. Cf. United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 103 S. Ct. 407
(1982).
The discharge of both the debtor and co-debtor in a single bankruptcy in the
case of a pure accommodation note can be further justified on the basis of judicial
economy where the cosigner is also encountering financial difficulties, since the
survival of the cosigned debt might be enough to trigger a second bankruptcy
proceeding, that of the cosigner. Perhaps a middle ground might be to provide for
a co-debtor stay in both chapter 7 and chapter 13 and to provide for a discharge
of the co-debtor on the obligation where (1) the debtor alone got the proceeds of
the loan, and (2) having to pay the cosigned obligation would work a hardship on
the co-debtor. See supra text accompanying notes 99-117 and 201-09 for a discussion of the BIA's proposed changes of 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(0, 722.
230. Although the partnership would not be eligible for chapter 13, a partner
in a failed partnership could file so long as s/he fit within the other requirements
for chapter 13. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(e). Of course, all partners are jointly or jointly
and severally liable for the unpaid obligations of a failed partnership. See UNIF.
PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 13-15, 6 U.L.A. 163-74 (1969). Thus, a chapter 13 debtor
could easily have significant business debts on which a co-debtor or co-debtors
share liability. A similar scenario could be constructed for a chapter 13 debtor
doing business as a sole proprietor who has had friends, relatives, or even professional sureties cosign for business debts.
231. A consumer debt is one incurred by the debtor primarily for personal,
household or family purposes. 11 U.S.C. § 101(7). This should be limited to the
situation where the debtor got the proceeds, to prevent fraud on the debtor's
creditors. If the co-debtor got the benefit of the advance, permitting the debtor to
separately classify the loan in order to pay it in full or in greater percentage than
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The Chapter 13 Plan
The BIA would make significant procedural and substantive
changes in chapter 13 plans. The BIA would require that, unless
the court orders otherwise, the debtor begin making payments
under the plan within thirty days after the plan is filed. 2 If the
debtor fails to make such payments, the chapter 13 is to be automatically dismissed. Obviously, this provision contemplates that
the debtor will begin making such payments before the plan is confirmed. Thus, the BIA provides that such payments are to be made
to the trustee who is to hold them until the court decides whether
or not to continue the plan. If the proposed plan or any other plan
is confirmed, the payments are distributed in accordance with the
confirmed plan. If no plan is confirmed, the payments are returned
to the debtor less costs of administration.2
The premise behind this proposal is that chapter 13 is fundamentally different from chapter 11. In chapter 11, the debtor is
given a reasonable period of time in which to resolve, if not solve,
his/her financial problems before being required to begin a payment program to creditors.2 4 Chapter 13 offers a debtor no similar
the amounts the debtor proposes to pay to other unsecured creditors would in
effect work a fraud on the other unsecured creditors. They would be paid less
than they would otherwise be paid were the cosigned claim not paid in full. At the

same time, the debtor would, in effect, be making a gift to the recipient of the
proceeds of the advance by paying off the cosigned debt. By way of example, suppose the debtor bought a car as a gift for a friend. If the debtor paid cash for the

car while insolvent, the car could be recovered as a fraudulent conveyance. See id.
§ 548. Yet, if the debtor were paying the car off in installments, permitting separate classification of that debt because the recipient was also liable on the note

would permit the debtor to accomplish exactly the same result. Thus, the right of
separate classification should be limited to the situation where the debtor got the
proceeds of the loan. Cf. id. § 1301(c)(1). In addition, 11 U.S.C. § 548, as well as §
1301, should be changed to make it clear that neither the co-debtor stay nor the
right of separate classification are available where the debtor gave the co-debtor
consideration to induce the co-debtor to become liable on the note.

A co-debtor stay should also be added to chapter 7, preventing a creditor on a

consumer debt from going against an individual accommodation. maker with the

debtor unless the debtor fails to reaffirm the full obligation by the time of
discharge.
232. S. 2000 § 17(2). H.R. 4786 §'17(2) has no 30-day grace period; instead, it
requires that payments begin immediately on the filing of the plan.

233. S. 2000 § 17(2).
234. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1121 which gives a debtor the exclusive right to file
a plan for the first 120 days of the ordinary chapter 11 case. The 120-day period
can be extended or shortened by the court, but it is clear that no plan is contem-
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respite. The plan must be filed with the petition or within ten days
thereafter.'8" A relatively early confirmation hearing is contemplated with payments presumably to begin shortly thereafter.18
Only in the case of a battle over confirmation will creditors be significantly delayed. The need for the proposed change is, therefore,
less than clear. The Code requires that secured creditors receive
payments with a present value equal to the value of their security
under a chapter 13 plan, while nonpriority unsecured creditors receive payments with a present value at least equal to what they
would receive in an immediate chapter 7 liquidation. 87 Therefore,
creditors, other than perhaps priority unsecured creditors,sss are
not financially injured by delay in payments if a chapter 13 plan is
eventually confirmed. If the plan is not confirmed and the case is
converted to one under chapter 7, there is some delay and potential for financial injury. However, since general unsecured creditors
will usually receive nothing in a consumer chapter 7 and secured
creditors will receive their collateral or its value in a chapter 7 liquidation, the potential for injury is generally limited to partially
secured creditors who will suffer some loss from the diminution in
plated in the usual case until well after the petition. In fact, § 1121 does not even
require that a plan be filed in the 120-day period. It merely gives the debtor the
exclusive right to do so during that period of time. Thereafter, any other party, as
well as the debtor, may file a plan. See also ImmuM RuL.Es, supra note 13, Rule
3005. In addition, the plan approval process in chapter 11, requiring the approval
of a disclosure statement, voting by affected creditors and equity holders, and
judicial confirmation, is often a long and involved process. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1125,
1126, 1129. Nothing in chapter 11 suggests or requires that the debtor is to make
any payments to creditors or into court before a plan is confirmed.
235. 11 U.S.C. 1321; BANKR. PRoc., supra note 126, Rule 13-201(a). The 10day period may be extended for cause shown.
236. 11 U.S.C. § 1324; BANKR. PRoc., supra note 126, Rule 13-213(a). The
confirmation hearing may be as early as the time fixed for the creditors' meeting.
Id. Since the bankruptcy judge may not attend that creditors' meeting, 11 U.S.C.
§ 341(c), the confirmation hearing must be held separate from the creditors' meeting even though it could be held on the same day. The creditors' meeting is to be
held from 20 to 40 days after a chapter 13 petition. INTiRM RuLs, supra note 13,
Rule 2003(a). But see In re Robinson, 22 Bankr. 497 (W.D. Va. 1982).
237. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4), (5).
238. The plan must provide for payment in full for priority unsecured claims
over the life of the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2). It is unclear whether this merely
requires the principal amount of such claims to be paid in full or whether the
claimant must receive the present value of its claim in full. See, e.g., D. EPSTEIN &
J. LANDERS, DEBTORS AND CREDrroRS 579-80 (1982). See also In re Christian, 25
Bankr. 438 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1982) (IRS not entitled to present value of its priority
unsecured claim in chapter 13).
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value of the collateral and loss of a few months' interest. This
seems like a small price to pay for giving the chapter 13 debtor a
brief period before payments come due to get his/her financial
house in order and to come up with a feasible plan.289 Such a brief
delay would seem to enhance the possibility of a successful chapter
13, an outcome which is in the interests of both the debtor and the
creditors.
The most significant legal battles to date under the BRA have
been fought over what payment, if any, the debtor is required to
make to general unsecured creditors under a chapter 13 plan. The
BRA requires the debtor to offer general unsecured creditors payments with a present value at least equal to what those creditors
would have received had the debtor filed a chapter 7 proceeding
instead of a chapter 13.1 ' 0 Thus, it is often said that general unsecured creditors must fare at least as well in the chapter 13 as
they would have in a chapter 7 liquidation. The problem is that in
most consumer chapter 7 cases, the general unsecured creditors
can expect no dividend. Thus, a chapter 13 debtor can meet the
239. The proposal would seem to foreclose the type of plan where the debtor
proposes to pay secured and unsecured creditors the required values under 11
U.S.C. § 1325, but where the first payment is to be delayed until, say, 90 or 180
days after confirmation. It is unclear why such a plan should be banned per se. If
the plan is proposed in good faith, and offers secured creditors the value of their
collateral with interest and offers unsecured creditors the amount that they would
have received in a chapter 7 liquidation with interest, the fact of the delay in
payments would be irrelevant except in the unusual case where the particular
creditor could show a need for the cash flow of payments from this particular
debtor. This is particularly true in light of the fact that a debtor who has no
current income, but is expecting substantial income in three to six months, would
probably be ineligible to file a chapter 7 petition under the BIA and would, in
effect, be forced into chapter 13. See supra text accompanying notes 37-86. The
proposal does permit the court to vary the requirement of preconfirmation payments to the trustee, and perhaps this would be a case for such variation. However, the fact remains that what chapter 13 is looking for is value of payments
rather than timing of cash flow. To permit a debtor to delay payments in some
cases will improve feasibility and thus improve the chances of creditors receiving
those values.
In addition, it is worth noting that it is doubly insulting to a debtor whose
plan for repayment in chapter 13 has been denied confirmation to have to pay the
costs of administering payments under the abortive plan which the debtor was
forced to make on pain of automatic dismissal. Presumably, those costs will be up
to 10% of the monies paid. 11 U.S.C. § 1302(e)(1)(B). Where there has been a
lengthy confirmation fight, perhaps going to the court of appeals or even the Supreme Court, the debtor's payments could be a significant dollar amount.
240. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4).
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technical requirement of value equivalent to chapter 7 dividends
by offering unsecured creditors no payment whatsoever. Many
debtors have proposed just that. Courts have agonized over
whether such so-called "zero percentage plans" can be confirmed
under the BRA. Courts have refused confirmation on grounds that
such plans are not proposed in good faith 41 or that the scheme of
chapter 13 seems to contemplate some payments to unsecured
creditors. 42 It would unnecessarily lengthen this article to enter
into the debate about whether zero percentage or nominal percentage plans can be confirmed under present chapter 13. Suffice it to
say that the often contradictory provisions of the BRA do not offer
any easy or clear answer to the question.
The BIA makes two significant changes in the standards for
confirming a chapter 13 plan. First, it would require that the plan
represent "a bona fide effort which is consistent with the debtor's
ability to repay his debts, after providing for himself and his dependents."24 3 Second, it would require that "the plan extend for
five years or the plan provide for payments of a reasonable portion
of allowed unsecured claims. '2 ' While these two provisions are not
much clearer than the present law, they do seem to allow for the
confirmation of nominal percentage plans. The bona fide effort
241. See, e.g., In re Miller, 24 Bankr. 786 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); Ohio v.
Wilkinson, 24 Bankr. 474 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982); In re Fulghum, 22 Bankr. 526
(Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1982). Most courts of appeals which have considered the question have concluded that minimal payments are not per se violative of good faith.
See In re Kitchens, 702 F.2d 885 (11th Cir. 1983); In re Estus, 695 F.2d 311 (8th
Cir. 1982); Deans v. O'Donnell, 692 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1982); Barnes v. Whelan,
689 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1982); In re Goeb, 675 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1982); In re
Rimgale, 669 F.2d 426 (7th Cir. 1982). But see In re Terry, 630 F.2d 634 (8th Cir.
1980).
242. See, e.g., In re Temple, 25 Bankr. 285 (W.D. Ark. 1982); In re Seman, 4
Bankr. 568 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980). See also In re Terry, 630 F.2d 634 (8th Cir.
1980); In re lacovoni, 2 Bankr. 256 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980).
243. S. 2000 § 19(a); H.R. 4786 § 19(1).
244. S.2000 § 19(d). H.R. 4786 § 19(4) uses a clearer approach by providing
numerical certainty. The plan must extend for at least five years unless it offers
unsecured creditors 70% of their claims. The Senate bill is less clear although the
legislative history takes the following position:
In general, and excluding hardship circumstances, a debtor should contemplate the repayment of at least 70 percent of allowed unsecured
claims for a proposed plan that has a duration of no more than 3 years,
unless the repayment of that percentage of such claims would be unfeasible even if the plan were to extend over a greater period of time.
S. Rep. 446, supra note 1, at 46.
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standard seems to require that the debtor try in good faith to pay
something to his/her creditors. It does not clarify whether the
debtor must have any disposable income after provision for support of himself/herself and his/her dependents. A debtor who had
no such available income might make a bona fide effort to pay by
reducing living expenses to below income or by trying but failing to
earn income for creditors above living expenses. It is unclear
whether in such circumstances a zero percentage plan might be
confirmed. Perhaps that is the difference between the phrases
"bona fide effort" and "best effort," so that if the debtor's best
effort produces zero for general unsecured creditors, it is somehow
or other not bona fide. 24 5 This problem should be resolved more
clearly in the legislation or at least in the legislative history.
Assuming the debtor proposes to make payments to general
unsecured creditors which meet the bona fide effort hurdle, the
debtor's plan apparently must be confirmed if either the proposed
payments extend for five years or if the payments are for less than
five years but offer general unsecured creditors a reasonable portion of allowed unsecured claims. 24 This provision is written in the

disjunctive. Thus, it clearly postulates two alternative tests. Any

245. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(9)(B)(ii). The legislative history suggests that the
effect of the change will be to resolve "the uncertainty in the case law by making
it clear that (1) income not necessary for .support is to be committed to the plan;
and (2) no minimum payment to creditors is required." S. Rep. 446, supra note 1,
at 46. These two standards in tandem would seem to permit zero percentage or
nominal percentage plans where the debtor's disposable income permits no payments to unsecured creditors since such would apparently be a "bona fide effort."
The BIA does not clarify whether a debtor who can make no payments to unsecured creditors qualifies as an "individual with regular income." See 11 U.S.C. §
101(24). See also In re Terry, 630 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1980). In addition, the BIA
only seeks to clarify the "good faith" requirement for confirmation found in 11
U.S.C. § 1325. It does not affect the other requirements for confirmation. Thus,
even if a debtor were completely unable to make any payments to unsecured creditors, a chapter 13 plan could not be confirmed if the debtor had nonexempt property which would be available to pay such unsecured creditors a dividend in a
chapter 7 proceeding, as such a plan would not offer the creditors the required
liquidation value minimum. See id. § 1325(a)(4). Similarly, even if the debtor had
no assets available to creditors in chapter 7, so that in theory a zero percentage
plan represented a bona fide effort under the BIA, a zero percentage plan could
not be confirmed where one or more of the debtor's unsecured creditors had a
priority claim because holders of unsecured priority claims must be paid in full
under a chapter 13 plan unless they agree otherwise. See id. §§ 1322(a)(2),
1325(a)(1). See also id. § 507.
246. S. 2000 § 19(d). See supra note 244.

[1982:1]

BANKRUPTCY IMPROVEMENTS ACT

plan which is a bona fide effort to pay general unsecured creditors
a reasonable percentage of their claims over any period of time up
to five years is to be approved. However, what is a reasonable percentage of such claims is less than clear. At one point the BIA
would have defined "reasonable" as seventy percent of general unsecured claims. A Senate committee report in fact used that number.2 47 Alternatively, a debtor who is unable to pay general unsecured creditors a reasonable portion of claims can still get a
chapter 13 plan confirmed by proposing to make a bona fide effort
to pay general unsecured creditors an unreasonable portion of
their claims over a five-year period. This would seem to permit
nominal percentage chapter 13 plans in appropriate cases.
It is remarkable that the creditor interests behind the BIA
would make such a "loophole" available to consumer debtors.
While the BIA would eliminate the advantage which the present
chapter 13 discharge has over the chapter 7 discharge, 4 8 and while
the liquidation value standard would eliminate the possibility of a
nominal percentage chapter 13 plan for the debtor who had significant nonexempt assets s/he wished to keep,24 9 the nominal percentage chapter 13 plan would be of great significance to a debtor
who is ineligible for a discharge per se in a chapter 7 proceeding.2 50
A debtor does not have to be eligible for a discharge in chapter 7 to
receive a discharge in chapter 13.21 Thus, a debtor who is ineligible for a discharge in chapter 7 could file a chapter 13, if appropriate (based on income and liquidation values), propose a nominal
percentage plan, get it confirmed, and for the next five years make
insignificant payments to the trustee while enjoying the benefit of
the stay of creditor actions against person or property. 52 Such a
debtor could then receive a discharge on the significant unpaid bal247. S. Rep. 446, supra note 1, at 46.
248. See infra text accompanying notes 257-83.
249. A chapter 13 plan, to be confirmed, must offer nonpriority unsecured
creditors payments of a present value at least equal to that which those creditors
would have received had the debtor filed a chapter 7 petition instead of a chapter
13 petition. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4).
250. The grounds for denying a debtor a chapter 7 discharge are found in 11
U.S.C. § 727(a).
251. 11 U.S.C. § 1328; In re Bixby, 10 Bankr. 456 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981).
252. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 103(a). Such a debtor would enjoy only limited benefits under the co-debtor stay provision because that stay could be lifted as to the
co-debtor to the extent that the debtor did not propose to pay the debt under the
plan. In the hypothetical, this would be virtually the entire debt. See id. §

1301(c)(2).
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ances of general unsecured creditor claims at the end of the fiveyear period. "53 The delay in discharge to such consumer will be of
little significance so long as the stay remains in effect and the payments required under the plan are nominal. 4
Even more remarkable is the fact that the creditor interests
behind the BIA overlooked a significant source of potential payment in chapter 13-possible increases in the debtor's income during the five-year period. The BRA provides the debtor with a remedy for certain unforeseen and unforeseeable decreases in the
debtor's income during a chapter 13 plan in the form of a hardship
discharge. "55 However, neither the BRA nor the BIA provides creditors with any remedy should a debtor's income unexpectedly increase during a chapter 13 plan. What appeared to be a bona fide
effort five-year nominal percentage plan at confirmation might lose
that status should the debtor find a new job at a significantly
higher salary six months later. This problem could easily be remedied by requiring the debtor to report changes in income to the
trustee and by permitting the trustee and/or creditors to propose
modifications to a confirmed chapter 13 plan in light of changes in
circumstances.15
253. Id. § 1328. All that is required for a debtor to receive a discharge as of
right in chapter 13 is the completion of the required payments under a confirmed
plan. There is no requirement that unsecured creditors receive any minimum percentage of payment. See, e.g., In re Burrell, 6 Bankr. 360 (N.D. Cal. 1980), rev'd &
remanded, 25 Bankr. 717 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
254. In fact, the debtor might well receive the discharge earlier. If the debtor
were to default under the plan, the debtor could receive a "hardship discharge" at

the time of default if eligible. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b).

255. Id. § 1328(b)(1). A debtor who has defaulted under a confirmed chapter
13 plan is eligible for a hardship discharge if: (1) the default occurred through no
fault of the debtor; (2) creditors have already received payments with a value at
least equal to what they would have received had the debtor pursued a chapter 7
proceeding in lieu of the chapter 13; and (3) no modification of the debtor's plan
is practical. Id. § 1328(b). The hardship discharge, unlike the normal chapter discharge, does not discharge the debtor on unpaid portions of those debts which
would not be dischargeable in a chapter 7 proceeding. See Id. § 1328(c). See also
Id. § 523(a).
256. Under present law, only a debtor may propose a chapter 13 plan, id. §
1321, and only a debtor may propose a modification of a chapter 13 plan. Id. §
1329. Thus, the suggestion in the text represents a fundamental change in chapter
13 philosophy. The plan would no longer necessarily be the debtor's plan. Instead,
if the debtor's income level significantly increased during the execution of a confirmed plan, the court and/or creditors could propose an increase in the payments
under the plan which the debtor would be forced to accept under threat of dismissal of the chapter 13 proceeding. Since the debtor does have the option of
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The Scope of the Chapter 13 Discharge
While the BIA would make no changes in the grant of a chapter 13 discharge, it would make changes in the effect of a chapter
13 discharge. Under the BRA, a chapter 13 discharge is much
broader than a chapter 7 or a chapter 11 discharge for an individual debtor.2 5 Generally,25 8 a chapter 13 discharge discharges all
debts against a debtor provided for in the plan.2 5 9 With one exception, this includes claims against the debtor which would otherwise
be nondischargeable.2 0 Thus, chapter 13 debtors have been able to
dismissing the chapter 13 in such circumstances, id. § 1307(b), permitting the
court and/or creditors to force a plan of repayment on a debtor would not seem to
infringe on constitutional prohibitions against involuntary servitude. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. However, 11 U.S.C. § 1307(b) probably ought to be
amended to give a debtor an absolute right to dismiss a chapter 13 case whenever
a modification is forced on the debtor requiring an increase in payments under a
confirmed plan.
As presently written, if the change in 11 U.S.C. § 1329 proposed in this note
is adopted, the following scenario could take place, assuming that the BIA is enacted. A debtor files a chapter 7. The court finds the debtor's anticipated income
level is too high and threatens to dismiss the chapter 7. The debtor converts the
chapter 7 to chapter 13 under 11 U.S.C. § 706. A chapter 13 plan is confirmed.
The debtor begins payments and then has a significant increase in income. The
court forces the debtor to increase the payments to creditors by modifying the
debtor's plan. Under present 11 U.S.C. § 1307(b), the debtor would not have an
absolute right of dismissal because the chapter 13 was begun by a conversion
under 11 U.S.C. § 706. Thus, in theory, the debtor could be forced to make increased payments involuntarily by being denied the right to dismiss the case. This
could run afoul of thirteenth amendment prohibitions.
The Butler bill did not overlook this potential source of benefit to creditors.
H.R. 7294 § 316(d).
The notion of post-petition changes in the fate of the debtor having an effect
on the bankruptcy proceeding is not unknown under the Bankruptcy Reform Act.
See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5).
257. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) with id. §§ 727(b), 1141(d)(2).
258. The broader chapter 13 discharge does not apply if the debtor receives a
hardship discharge. Under the chapter 13 hardship discharge, all debts which are
nondischargeable in chapter 7 are nondischargeable in chapter 13 as well. Id. §8
523(a), 1328(c).
259. Id. § 1328(a). A chapter 13 plan which provides no payment to unsecured creditors has, nevertheless, "provided for" such creditors within the
meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a). In re Gregory, 19 Bankr. 668 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1982). Of course, disallowed claims are also discharged for no payment. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1328(a).
260. The exception is nondischargeable alimony, child support and similar
claims. To the extent that such claims are nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(5), they are nondischargeable in chapter 13. Id. § 1328(a)(2). Priority tax
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discharge intentional tort claims," 1 student loans262 and other
claims " which would be nondischargeable in a chapter 7 or 11
proceeding by paying a small fraction (or perhaps nothing) on such
claims under chapter 13. The possibility and reality of the discharge of such claims against a debtor for little or no payment has
sparked considerable judicial criticism. 2 4 The BIA would respond
to this criticism by providing that those debts which are not dischargeable in an individual chapter 7 or 11 case are also not dischargeable under a chapter 13 plan." 5 However, the BIA goes further and provides that nondischargeable debts must be paid in full
over the life of the plan."'
The BIA proposal once again amounts to overkill. As a practical matter, it will delay confirmation of chapter 13 plans for conclaims, which are nondischargeable under § 523(a)(1)(A), must be provided for in
full for a chapter 13 plan to be confirmed. Id. §§ 1322(a)(2), 1325(a)(1). Therefore,
such taxes are in effect nondischargeable in chapter 13. See also id. § 507(a)(2),
(6). However, other taxes which are nondischargeable under § 523(a)(1), but
which are not entitled to priority in distribution, would be dischargeable in a
chapter 13 proceeding. See In re Frost, 19 Bankr. 804 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982).
Two other types of claims are not dischargeable in chapter 13. The first is a
long term obligation which has been cured under the debtor's plan, but final payment of which is not due until after the term of the plan. See 11 U.S.C. §§
1328(a)(1), 1322(b)(5). The other type of claim not discharged by the completion
of a chapter 13 plan is a post-petition debt where the prior approval of the trustee
could have been obtained before the debt-was incurred, but was not. 11 U.S.C. §9
1328(d), 1305(a)(2).
261. See, e.g., In re Fuksa, 23 Bankr. 258 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1982); In re
Tackaberry, 13 Bankr. 881 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981); In re Hudson, 9 Bankr. 363
(Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1981); In re Seely, 6 Bankr. 309 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980).
262. See, e.g., In re Eichelberger, 6 Bankr. 705 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1980).
263. See, e.g., In re Young, 10 Bankr. 17 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980) (criminal
fine); In re Pike, 14 Bankr. 241 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981) (debt found to be nondischargeable in prior bankruptcy). But see In re Hochdorf, 25 Bankr. 207 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1982).
264. Much of the judicial criticism has come up under the rubric of "good
faith" as used in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3). See, e.g., In re Rimgale, 669 F.2d 426
(7th Cir. 1982); In re Seman, 4 Bankr. 568 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Pike, 14
Bankr. 241, 243 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 198i). See also S. Rep. 446, supra note 1, at 26-

27.

265. S.2000 § 20(a).
266. Id. § 18(a)(3). The BIA would in effect treat nondischargeable claims
the way that priority claims are presently treated in chapter 13 under 11 U.S.C. §
1322(a)(2). The BIA would appear to require only that nondischargeable claims
receive payment in full over the life of the plan, not that such claims receive
payment with a present value equal to the amount of the claim. See supra note
238.
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siderable periods of time while disputes over the dischargeability
of particular claims are resolved. Since the BIA removes the threat
of a creditor having to pay a debtor's attorney's fees for a successful defense to the most common objections to dischargeability in
the case of all except the most frivolous objections,' 7 it is likely
that objections to dischargeability will be a regular feature of chapter 13 proceedings. Thus, although the debtor will file a plan and
begin making payments to the trustee under the plan as proposed,2 68 the debtor's plan will have to assume strategically that all
debts are dischargeable. If the debtor loses on the dischargeability
issue, the proposed plan will have to be amended to provide payment in full for any nondischargeable debts. Should a significant
dollar amount of debt be determined to be nondischargeable, the
payments the debtor will be making will not be adequate to cover
required distributions under the proposed plan. How the debtor
would solve this problem is less than clear. Obviously, a significant
cash deposit at confirmation would be impractical. Thus, should
one or more claims be found to be nondischargeable, the only feasible solution would be for a chapter 13 debtor to modify the proposed plan to use the funds already on deposit with the trustee
and the debtor's future income in a different way than originally
contemplated. The debtor would place those general unsecured
creditors holding nondischargeable claims in a separate class and
make payments to those creditors at a level such that their claims
are paid in full over the life of the plan.'" Only those amounts, if
any, of disposable income which the debtor has left after providing
for holders of nondischargeable claims would go to those general
unsecured creditors holding dischargeable claims. In fact, holders
of dischargeable claims could expect to receive nothing unless the
debtor has sufficient income to pay nondischargeable claims in full.
The simple result of the BIA proposal with respect to treatment of nondischargeable claims in chapter 13 proceedings is to
give general unsecured creditors holding nondischargeable claims
267. See supra text accompanying notes 48-51.
268. See supra text accompanying notes 19-30.

269. The debtor would have two obvious reasons for doing this. One, the BIA
would require it as pre-condition to confirmation of the plan, so that the debtor
would have to make such a reallocation. Two, it would be in the debtor's interest
to amend the plan to provide for payment in full of nondischargeable debts so
that the debtor would not have to pay the balance of such claims after the completion of the chapter 13 plan. The BIA would, in fact, facilitate this result by
permitting separate classification of nondischargeable claims. See S. 2000 § 18(b).
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greater payments at the expense of unsecured creditors holding
dischargeable claims. In other words, the BIA as a practical matter
gives such claims priority over dischargeable claims.27 0 The debtor
really does not care who gets what. The debtor's disposable income
is a constant; the bona fide effort standard of the BIA should be a
constant without regard to the types of debts which a debtor owes,
as it focuses on disposable income.2 71 Therefore, a fixed dollar
amount will be available in chapter 13 whether or not the debtor
owes nondischargeable debts. It is irrelevant to the debtor how
that fund is distributed so long as the debtor emerges from the
proceeding debt-free. In fact, the combination of the allowance of
separate classification of nondischargeable claims and the requirement of payment in full for such claims over the life of the plan
actually is of help to the debtor in achieving debt-free status on
the completion of the chapter 13 plan. It would seem that the BIA
would better achieve its goal of protecting all creditors by providing that these unsecured, nondischargeable claims in chapter 7 are
not dischargeable in chapter 13 proceedings as well, if that is in
fact the congressional desire. The BIA should then also prohibit
the debtor from classifying such claims separately and also prohibit the debtor from paying such claims in full over the life of the
plan unless all general unsecured claims are paid in full. This approach would allow holders of nondischargeable claims to protect
themselves by enforcing the unpaid balance of their claims after
the chapter 13; however, the protection of these rights would not
be at the expense of their fellow unsecured creditors.
Another benefit of this approach from the point of view of
creditors and the goals that the BIA seeks to accomplish is that
this would permit earlier distributions to creditors than would in
270. Compare the treatment of nondischargeable claims in chapter 13 proposed by the BIA with the treatment of priority claims in chapter 13 under 11
U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2). Of course, a finding that a claim is nondischargeable in no
way affects the priority of that claim. Most nondischargeable claims are nothing

more than general unsecured claims, entitled to no priority whatsoever. The benefit in a finding of nondischargeability lies not in an alteration of the order of
distribution in the bankruptcy itself, but in the fact that any unpaid portion of
the claim will survive the bankruptcy.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 243-56. Of course, the debtor will
still have to worry about providing at least the liquidation value of those creditors
holding nonpriority, dischargeable, unsecured claims. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4).

However, in most consumer cases, chapter 7 liquidation values for general unsecured creditors would be zero, so that will not usually present a problem to the
chapter 13 debtor.
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fact occur under the BIA proposal. If the BIA proposal were
adopted, no chapter 13 plan could be confirmed and no distribution could be made to creditors until after all objections to dischargeability of particular claims had been resolved completely.
Only then could the court determine who would be entitled to
what. During the interim, although the debtor would be making
payments to the trustee under a proposed plan,2 72 no actual payments to creditors would be made until the plan was confirmed.
This distribution could be substantially delayed by protracted litigation over the dischargeability of any particular claim. Of course,
this problem could be solved easily if the proposal with respect to
nondischargeability in chapter 13 suggested earlier in this article2 73
were adopted. In such circumstances, a finding of nondischargeability would not equal de facto priority; thus, confirmation
would not have to be delayed while dischargeability disputes were
resolved.
Finally, it is worth noting that the BIA proposal requiring
payment in full of nondischargeable claims in chapter 13 proceedings does not permit variation even with the consent of the creditor affected. This, of course, means that a debtor who does not
have sufficient disposable income (or available assets) to pay nondischargeable claims in full in five years is per se precluded from
using chapter 13. s ' Such an approach may well be counterproductive from the point of view of creditors. Were the BIA to be enacted, a debtor might be ineligible to file chapter 7 because of too
much income, but unable to come up with a feasible chapter 13
plan because of problems with paying nondischargeable claims in
full.2 7 5 In such a case, presumably creditors are left to state law
272. See supra text accompanying notes 232-38.
273. See the discussion in the previous paragraph of the text.
274. S. 2000 § 18(a)(3) would amend 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a) to add as another
mandatory requirement of a chapter 13 plan that it provide for payment in full of
nondischargeable debts. The language of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1) prohibits the confirmation of a chapter 13 plan unless it "complies with the provisions of [chapter
13]." Thus, a plan which did not offer full payment to nondischargeable claims
could not be confirmed even if the holder of a nondischargeable claim agreed to
accept less. Contrast the language with respect to the holders of priority claims in
11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2). Payment could come from either the debtor's income or

assets. Id. §1322(a)(1), (b)(8).
275. Nothing in the BIA as presently drafted gears the threshold test of in-

come for eligibility for chapter 7 relief into the question of whether the debtor is
eligible to file a chapter 13 petition or is in a position to come up with a feasible
chapter 13 plan. See supra text accompanying notes 37-86. Perhaps the solution
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collection remedies. The method by which a creditor with a nondischargeable claim reaches a debtor's future income under state
law is to obtain a judgment and to enforce that judgment against
the debtor's wages by way of garnishment. State law as well as federal law generally limits the percentage or amount of wages which
can be garnished. 17 There are no comparable limits of the amount
or percentage of the debtor's income which can be made available
to creditors under a chapter 13 plan. In addition, wage garnishments in some states are of limited duration only and, on expiration, may require an elaborate procedure of renewal.17 Of course,
there is no comparable problem in chapter 13 where, in the normal
case, payments continue regularly over the life of the confirmed
plan. As a result, creditors, including those with nondischargeable
claims, may well prefer to take regular pro rata payments from a
chapter 13 trustee rather than pursue their own collection efforts.
This would be particularly true if the debtor were to continue to
owe the unpaid balance of the nondischargeable claim after completion of a chapter 13 plan. A fortiori, if a creditor holding a nondischargeable claim chooses to accept the payments under the
chapter 13 plan as payment in full, the Bankruptcy Code should
not foreclose such an option. That is strictly a matter between the
debtor and the assenting creditor. The BIA proposal should clearly8
permit such alternative arrangements by consent of the parties.1
to this problem is to make it clear that a chapter 7 petition is to be dismissed on
grounds of excessive income only if the debtor is (a) eligible to file a chapter 13
petition and (b) realistically able to come up with a feasible chapter 13 plan. This
approach would make it necessary to remove the present limits of $100,000 in
fixed unsecured debt and $350,000 in fixed secured debt on eligibility for chapter

13. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(e).

If the present BIA approach is continued, the debtor who is ineligible for
chapter 7 on income grounds and unable to come up with a feasible chapter 13
plan because of problems with nondischargeable debts could in theory find relief
in chapter 11. Although the debts would still be nondischargeable, id. §
1141(d)(2), there is no requirement that the plan provide for payment in full of
nondischargeable debts. However, it is unrealisitc to think that such a debtor
could afford the additional expense which the complication of a chapter 11 proceeding would entail. Chapter 11 is simply not designed for consumer debtors.
276. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (1976) (the lesser of 25% of disposable income or the amount by which disposable income exceeds 30 times the federal
minimum wage); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 12-803 (1981) (the lesser of 15% of
gross wages or the amount by which disposable income exceeds 30 times the federal minimum wage).
277. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 12-801 to 12-818.
278. That, of course, is the approach which already is used in chapter 13 for
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In fact, the entire BIA proposal with respect to the treatment
of nondischargeable debts in chapter 13 proceedings is another
seat-of-the-pants solution to a perceived problem without any hard
evidence as to the scope of the problem and with little thought as
to the appropriate solution. If it is assumed that the BRA system
which permits the discharge of otherwise nondischargeable debts
in chapter 13 proceedings for little or no payment is a problem, 79
then the solution proposed by the BIA of making such debts per se
nondischargeable and payable in full in chapter 13 is not the only
possible solution. It would seem that what is needed is a balance
between protecting the holders of nondischargeable claims and giving debtors who make a bona fide effort to pay creditors as much
as they can over a reasonable period of time a chance for a fresh
start. The BIA contains the framework for such a balancing without changing the BRA treatment of nondischargeable debts in
chapter 13. The problem is not that such claims are dischargeable
in part in chapter 13, but that they are dischargeable without any
requirement of either substantial payment or a bona fide effort by
the debtor to pay a fair portion of such claims in light of the
debtor's disposable income. The BRA does not require that the
chapter 13 debtor make substantial payments to general unsecured
creditors or that s/he make payments for any minimum period of
time. 80 This is probably the major defect in the existing chapter
13 scheme. The BIA corrects these defects by requiring a debtor to
make either substantial payments to general unsecured creditors or
to make a five-year bona fide effort to pay creditors.8 It would
seem that the debtor who does either of these deserves a fresh
start. Creditors, including those holding nondischargeable claims,
dealing with priority claims which must be paid in full under the plan unless the

holder of the claim agrees to accept a lesser amount. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2). The
BRA also recognizes consensual arrangements modifying bankruptcy law require-

ments or results in the reaffirmation area. See id. § 524(c), (d).
279. It is clear that the present system has led to some abuses or attempted
abuses. See, e.g., In re Rimgale, 669.F.2d 426 (7th Cir. 1982). It is not clear how
significant these abuses or attempted abuses are statistically and whether the attempts at abusing the broader discharge rights found in chapter 13 of the BRA
justify a wholesale change in the law.
280. In re Kitchens, 702 F.2d 885 (11th Cir. 1983); In re Estus, 695 F.2d 311

(8th Cir. 1982); Deans v. O'Donnell, 692 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1982); Barnes v. Whelan, 689 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1982); In re Goeb, 675 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1982); In re
Rimgale, 669 F.2d 426 (7th Cir. 1982). But see In re Terry, 630 F.2d 634 (8th Cir.

1980).

281. S. 2000 § 19(d). See supra text accompanying notes 243-56.
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who have received either substantial portions of their claims or
have had five years of access to the debtor's disposable income
have been treated fairly. Surely they have gotten all they reasonably could have expected from the debtor. In such circumstances,
discharging any unpaid balances or claims seems to be an appropriate balancing of the competing interests. This balancing approach is further recommended by the fact that this option would
be available only to small debtors. There is no danger that a
debtor owing large amounts of nondischargeable debts would use
chapter 13 to avoid such obligations, as the $100,000 limit on fixed
unsecured debts would make such debtors ineligible for chapter
13.282

CONCLUSION

The proposed BIA, with its basic changes in bankruptcy law,
appears to be subject to serious criticism in both concept and detail. Such fundamental changes in bankruptcy philosophy require
considerably more study and effort than has gone into the BIA. As
presently proposed, the BIA amounts to little more than a consumer creditor grab bag, an attempt by creditors to remedy every
real or perceived problem which consumer bankruptcy creates for
creditor interests. A major overhaul of such an important piece of
consumer protection law as the Bankruptcy Code should not be
based on purely partisan considerations. It is obvious that consumer interests were not represented in drafting the BIA; it is
equally obvious that they should have been. The idea of a
mandatory chapter 13 proceeding smacks of indentured servitude.
Creditor interests tell us that this is an idea whose time has come.
Unfortunately, that time was the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,28 and that time ended with the age of Charles Dickens. If
there are problems with the BRA in consumer cases, those
problems require solutions appropriate to the twentieth and
282. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e). This assumes, of course, that the present version of
the BIA contains no link between the dismissal of a chapter 7 petition on excessive income grounds and eligibility for chapter 13. The author prefers that such a
link be established which would necessitate abolition of the debt limits on those
individuals eligible for chapter 7 relief. See supra note 275.
283. Some of the earlier bankruptcy laws in this country conditioned a
debtor's discharge on the amounts which creditors were paid. This was a function
of the origins of bankruptcy as a creditor's rather than a debtor's remedy. See
generally Countryman, A History of American Bankruptcy Law, 81 COM. L.J. 226
(1976).
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twenty-first centuries, not the solutions of the halcyon days of
yore.

